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CONSTITUTIONAL MYOPIA: THE SUPREME
COURT’S BLINDNESS TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND RELIGIOUS EQUALITY
VALUES IN TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY
Alan Brownstein∗
It is difficult to analyze a Supreme Court decision that is as
fundamentally misguided and unpersuasive as last term’s decision in
Town of Greece v. Galloway, the case upholding state-sponsored
prayers before Town Board Meetings. In attempting to do so in this
Article, I critically evaluate the Court’s repeated failures to adequately
address the serious religious equality and religious liberty issues
presented in this case. With regard to religious equality concerns, for
example, the Court all but completely ignores the Town’s
discrimination in favor of established organized churches and against
minorities with too few adherents to organize a congregation in the
Town, nonaffiliated spiritual residents of the community, and
nonreligious residents. Even worse, the Court suggests that allowing
low level functionaries to develop informal and imprecise criteria to
determine who should be invited to offer prayers at board meetings
without adopting a policy or providing any guidance on how these
decisions should be reached somehow immunizes the Town from
serious constitutional scrutiny. Instead, I argue that this lack of
guidelines and policy itself should be understood to violate the First
Amendment because it so obviously increases the risk of biased and
discriminatory conduct.
The Court’s discussion of plaintiffs’ religious liberty concerns is
even more untenable. Plaintiffs argued that if a government official or
deliberative body has the discretionary authority to make decisions that
will seriously impact the needs and interests of individuals or small
groups of citizens, it is intrinsically coercive for those officials to ask
these citizens to engage in a religious exercise such as a prayer before
they submit their arguments or petitions to government decisionmakers. In order to reject these claims, Justice Kennedy describes an
∗ Professor of Law emeritus, University of California, Davis. B.A. Antioch College, 1969;
J.D., Harvard University, 1977. I wish to acknowledge the help I received from my research
assistant, Chris Ronne and from Peg Durkin and other library staff at the UC Davis School of
Law.
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understanding of social reality that is difficult to believe and impossible
to share. Perhaps most egregiously, Kennedy’s analysis treats prayer
as if it is some kind of abstract ceremonial activity instead of what it is
for most Americans—a personal, meaningful communication between
the individual and G-D.
The Article concludes with a discussion of the possible
implications of this decision for the constitutional protection of
religious liberty and equality in other contexts and circumstances.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Town of Greece is a modest, residential suburb bordering
the City of Rochester, in upstate New York, with a population of
roughly 94,000 residents.1 An elected Board governs the Town.2
Pursuant to its official duties, the Town Board holds monthly
meetings where its members, and other Town officials, sit on a dais
in front of an audience of residents.3 Attendance is modest. Typically
no more than ten residents are present during Board meetings.4
The Town Board engages in various ceremonial, legislative and
administrative (quasi adjudicatory) functions at these meetings.5
These monthly public sessions are designed to be participatory and
residents are given numerous opportunities to address the Board and
to try to influence its’ decisions.6 In many instances, residents at
meetings directly petition their government during public hearings.7
Traditionally, the Board’s meetings opened with a moment of
silence. In 1999, however, the Board changed its practice and began
to open its meetings with a prayer offered by a volunteer guest
“chaplain” invited to the meeting for that purpose.8 The process by
which the Town invited individuals to offer prayers at meetings was
informal and imprecise.9 No actual invitation policy was ever
adopted.10
The Town is predominantly Christian, but not all of its residents
share the same faith.11 To schedule a chaplain at an upcoming Board
meeting, town employees directly invited clergy from religious
congregations listed in a local newspaper and a Community Guide
published by the local Chamber of Commerce.12 Eventually,
employees compiled a list of clergy who had accepted the invitations

1. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 22 (2d. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014).
2. Id.
3. Brief for Respondents at 2, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No.
12-696).
4. Id.; Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1846 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1847.
7. See id.
8. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
9. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1831 (Alito, J., concurring).
10. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
11. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23–24.
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to offer prayers in the past and other available prayer-givers.13
Although a Buddhist Temple was located in the Town, and several
Jewish synagogues were located nearby but outside the Town’s
border, the list contained only Christian-affiliated organizations
within the Town’s boundaries.14
From the commencement of the Town’s prayer practice until
plaintiffs’ counsel challenged this activity, Christian clergy delivered
every prayer offered at a Town Board meeting.15 Although the Town
asserted that any resident could request to give the invocation, no
such policy was every written down, much less formally adopted.
The Town took no steps whatsoever to publicize this opportunity to
its residents.16
In response to prodding by plaintiffs’ counsel, the Town invited
four non-Christian individuals to offer prayers at meetings in 2008.
Two prayers were delivered by a Jewish layman who happened to be
a Board member’s acquaintance, one was offered by a Wiccan
Priestess who asked to be allowed to give the prayer, and the fourth
was presented by the chairman of the local Baha’i Temple, but only
after plaintiffs filed suit.17 These were the only non-Christians to
offer the state-sponsored prayer at some 130 Town Board meetings
between 1999 and 2010.18
During this period, approximately two-thirds of the prayers
offered made some reference to “‘Jesus,’ ‘Jesus Christ,’ ‘Your Son,’
or the ‘Holy Spirit.’”19 Many prayers included more extensive
Christian references and themes.20 Plaintiffs cited one prayer that
stated,
We look with anticipation to the celebration of Holy Week
and Easter. It is in the solemn events of next week that we
find the very heart and center of our Christian faith. We
acknowledge the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the
cross. We draw strength, vitality, and confidence from his
resurrection at Easter. Jesus Christ, who took away the sins
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 13–15.
See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
Id. at 24; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 9.
See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 24–25; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 8–12.
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of the world, destroyed our death, through his dying and in
his rising, he has restored our life. Blessed are you, who has
raised up the Lord Jesus, you will raise us, in our turn, and
put us by His side.21
Another prayer “disparaged those who question[ed] the Town’s
prayer practice, or who are not ‘Godfearing.’”22 Yet another
prayer disparagingly characterized those who challenged the
Town’s prayer practice as an “ignorant” “minority.”23
In offering the prayer, the invited chaplain stood in front of the
Board at a podium bearing the Town seal and faced the citizens in
attendance.24 Some chaplains asked the citizens to stand and “bow
[their] heads out of respect to God.”25 Board members, too, made
such requests and routinely stood, bowed their heads, and made the
sign of the cross.26 The chaplains typically offered their prayers on
behalf of the audience and the community, not on their own personal
behalf.27 No town official or Board member reviewed the prayers or
offered chaplains any guidance as to their content.28
A. The Second Circuit Opinion
Plaintiffs Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, a Jew and an
Atheist, challenged the Town’s practice, alleging that it violated the
Establishment Clause by having “the effect, even if not the purpose,
of establishing religion.”29 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in plaintiffs’ favor. Judge Calabresi, writing for a unanimous
panel, distinguished the Town’s prayer practice from the prayers
offered before state legislatures, which the Supreme Court had
upheld in Marsh v. Chambers.30 The prayers in Marsh were
non-sectarian,31 and the state legislature’s prayer practice, taken as a
whole, did not have “‘the effect of affiliating the government with
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(2014).
28.
29.
30.
31.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 9–10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 24, 32 (2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
See id. at 23.
Id. at 26.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 27 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).

378

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:371

any one specific faith or belief.’”32 The prayer practices of the Town
of Greece were decidedly different.
Judge Calabresi did not identify any specific aspect of the
Town’s practice that violated the Establishment Clause in and of
itself.33 Instead, he evaluated multiple factors that, taken together,
demonstrated that the Town had impermissibly aligned itself with the
Christian faith.34 The Town’s actions as well as its inactions
contributed to the court’s conclusion.35
The court found that “the Town’s process for selecting
prayer-givers virtually ensured a Christian viewpoint” would be
expressed.36 The Town ignored both congregations outside its
borders (even if they were attended by town residents) and
nonaffiliated residents that did not choose to join an organized
religion.37 Further, it made no attempt to inform the community that
it would allow residents from any faith or no faith who requested the
opportunity to deliver an invocation.38
The delivery of the prayers was also problematic. Guest
chaplains “appeared to speak on behalf of the town and its residents,
rather than only on behalf of themselves” by using terms like “we” or
“our” rather than using singular language such as “I” pray.39 It was
also common for prayer-givers to encourage residents to participate
in the prayer through physical movements such as standing or
bowing one’s head.40 While permitting these practices, the Board did
nothing to dispel the almost unavoidable impression that the Town
endorsed Christian beliefs.41 In sum although the court “ascribe[d] no
religious animus” to the Board or other Town officials, the court
concluded that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated the
Town’s affiliation with one religion, Christianity.42

32. Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989)).
33. See id. at 30.
34. See id. at 22, 30.
35. See id. at 30.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 31.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 32.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 32. Plaintiffs abandoned their claim that the Town intentionally discriminated
against non-Christians in selecting guest chaplains. See id. at 26.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINIONS43
A. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for the Court,
except for the section responding to plaintiffs’ coercion and religious
liberty claims. As to those issues, Justice Thomas wrote a separate
opinion with which Justice Scalia joined. Justice Alito added a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Kagan wrote a
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor, and Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion collapsed the numerous problems
with the Town’s prayer practices identified by plaintiffs and the
Second Circuit into two questions: (1) whether the Establishment
Clause requires that state-sponsored prayers offered at the beginning
of town board meetings must be nonsectarian in their content;44 and
(2) whether the prayer practices adopted by the Town of Greece
impermissibly coerced residents into participating in a religious
exercise.45 The Court majority emphatically answered “No” to both
questions.
With regard to the first question, Justice Kennedy’s analysis is
grounded in history and tradition. Kennedy argues that the offering
of sectarian prayers before Congress and state legislative sessions
was accepted by the Framers and the American people at the time of
the Constitution’s adoption and has “withstood the scrutiny of time
and political change.”46 The Court’s opinion in Marsh upheld the
constitutionality of such prayers.47 Any attempt to interpret Marsh to
permit only generic or ecumenical prayers was mistaken.48 Courts
and government officials lack the ability to distinguish impermissibly
sectarian from permissibly generic prayers.49 All prayers are
sectarian to some extent in that they may be challenged as conflicting

43. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
44. See id. at 1820–23.
45. See id. at 1824–28.
46. Id. at 1819 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)). Justice Kennedy did acknowledge, however, that there was
no information in the record indicating how prevalent it was to begin local government meetings
with prayers either historically or in current times. See id.
47. See id. at 1818–20.
48. See id. at 1820–22.
49. See id. at 1822.
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with some person’s beliefs.50 Further, government lacks the authority
to restrict clergy to offering only non-sectarian state-sponsored
prayers.51 Once an individual is invited to offer a prayer at a state
function, the government is prohibited from requiring that the
content of the prayer must be generic or ecumenical.52
Justice Kennedy did concede that the historical tradition of
legislative prayer upheld in Marsh had some substantive limits. The
purpose of the legislative prayer was ceremonial—to solemnize the
legislative deliberations and inspire legislators to work together for
the common good.53 Prayers that disparaged non-adherents or
attempted to proselytize or preach conversion exceeded the
permissible scope of these invocations.54 Even where individual
prayers ignored these constraints, however, the Constitution would
not be violated. There must be a pattern of disparaging or
proselytizing prayers over time to support a viable Establishment
Clause claim.55 No such pattern had been demonstrated by plaintiffs
in this case.
Justice Kennedy also found no fault with the Town’s “informal”
process of inviting clergy from local congregations to offer prayers.56
The Town was not required to solicit clergy from congregations
outside its borders.57 Further, any failings of this invitation process
were effectively cured by the Town’s contention that it would have
allowed any resident to offer a prayer at the Board meeting who
requested the opportunity to do so.58 It did not seem to matter to
Justice Kennedy that this unwritten policy had neither been formally
adopted nor publicized.
As to the second question, plaintiffs argued their coercion claim
more rigorously before the Supreme Court than they had below.
Unlike citizens sitting in the gallery of Congress or a state
legislature, they argued, residents attending town board meetings are
not passive observers. They are active participants in government

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 1822–23.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1823–24.
See id. at 1824.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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who attend meetings for the purpose of speaking to the Board and
influencing its decisions.59 As such, residents would naturally want
to avoid alienating the decision-makers they would soon be
petitioning.
The setting and nature of the Town’s prayer practice magnified
coercion concerns. The guest chaplains faced the residents in the
audience, not the Board. The prayer was directed at audience
members who were often asked to stand, bow their heads, or join in
the prayer.60 Commonly, the chaplain claimed to speak in the name
of those who were present. Thus, the prayer was not the chaplain’s
prayer alone. It purported to be the prayer of everyone in the room.61
Typically, there were only a few residents in attendance at meetings.
Accordingly, there was no anonymity in this setting. It was
impossible to refuse to stand or to leave during the prayer without
being noticed.62
In these circumstances, plaintiffs argued, state-sponsored prayer
is intrinsically coercive. Confronted with requests to participate in a
prayer that is joined in by Board members and the majority of
residents in the audience, dissenting residents would feel
considerable pressure to comply. They would reasonably fear that the
failure to do so would offend one or more Board members, the very
decision-makers they were trying to influence.63
Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish the setting of town board
meetings from Congress or state legislative sessions fell on deaf ears.
Justice Kennedy concluded that their coercion claims were precluded
both by historical tradition and the precedent of Marsh.64
Significantly, he determined that the “principal audience” for the
prayers was the Board members themselves, not residents in the
audience.65 Further, the invitations to participate were made by
prayer-givers, not by Board members.66 From Justice Kennedy’s
perspective, audience members should understand the American

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22.
See id. at 23.
See id. at 29.
See id. at 24.
See id. at 23–30.
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825–26 (2014).
See id. at 1826.
See id.
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tradition of legislative prayer and appreciate the benign, ceremonial
nature of this activity.67
Justice Kennedy also challenged plaintiffs’ arguments that there
was anything intrinsically coercive about the Town of Greece’s
prayer practice. The Board never suggested to residents that their
failure to participate in the guest chaplain’s prayers would be held
against them or would influence the Board’s decision.68 No evidence
in the record demonstrated that the Board had rejected the petitions
or arguments of dissenters in the past.69 Also, Justice Kennedy
explained, anyone who objected to a prayer was free to leave the
room while it was being offered. No one would notice them doing so
or consider their conduct to be disrespectful.70 If residents did stand
for a prayer they could not in good conscience join, no one would
think that standing signaled any agreement with what was being
said.71 Adult residents of the Town would simply be acknowledging
a long-standing, religiously-neutral, American tradition.72
B. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a concurring
opinion for the purpose of addressing Justice Kagan’s dissent. Justice
Alito defended the unguided and careless process the Town
employed in inviting guest chaplains, which resulted in only
Christian clergy being asked to offer prayers, as a series of minor
errors that did not reach the level of constitutional significance.73 Not
much more could be reasonably expected from small towns without
imposing unacceptably heavy burdens on local governments.74
Justice Alito also doubted that the Town of Greece’s prayer practices
at Board meetings were strikingly different than the practices of
many other towns and cities throughout the country.75 Those
practices may well be imperfect, but their failings do not require
67. See id. at 1825.
68. See id. at 1826.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1827.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1827–28.
73. See id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring). For example, Justice Alito apparently believed
the Town should have included clergy from neighboring synagogues on its invitation list, but its
failure to do so was innocent error. Id.
74. See id. at 1831.
75. See id. at 1831–32.
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judicial intervention. Certainly, the case did not justify what Justice
Alito deemed to be Justice Kagan’s overwrought dissent.76
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia,
reiterated his longstanding position that the Establishment Clause is
not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and does not bind
state or local governments. Accordingly, it is not applicable in this
case.77 Even if the Establishment Clause did apply to state and local
governments, however, Justice Thomas argued the Town of Greece’s
prayer practices would not violate the Constitution. The only
coercion practices that warranted concern historically were those
“support[ed] by force of law and threat of penalty.”78 Plaintiffs did
not allege that they were subjected to any such formal sanctions.
D. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer’s dissent echoed the totality of the circumstances
analysis employed by the Second Circuit and focused on many of the
same factors identified in Judge Calabresi’s opinion. In particular, he
emphasized the ease with which the Town could have mitigated
many of these concerns. To expand and diversify the pool of
individuals invited to offer prayers at Board meetings, for example,
the Town could have posted a notice of its willingness to allow any
resident to offer the invocation on its website, announced this
inclusive policy at the beginning of meetings, and informed
congregations located just outside the Town’s borders that they
would be welcome to participate as well.79 Instead, Justice Breyer
noted, “the town chose to do nothing.”80
E. Justice Kagan’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kagan authored the primary dissent. To Justice Kagan,
the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violated core constitutional
equality principles. As a general matter, the Establishment Clause
prohibits the state from “align[ing] itself with, and plac[ing] its
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 1834.
See id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1837–38.
See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.

384

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:371

imprimatur on, a particular religious creed.”81 Moreover, failures to
abide by this requirement are magnified when individuals are
interacting with and participating in “the institutions and process of
government,” as was true in this case.82 When an individual is asked
to pray by a government official or a member of the clergy invited by
a government official when she is seeking benefits or services or
seeking to influence government decision-makers, religious
minorities must either subordinate their beliefs or publicly set
themselves apart from the majority on religious grounds. The prayer
becomes “an instrument for dividing her from adherents to the
community’s majority religion, and for altering the very nature of her
relationship with her government.”83
Justice Kagan offered several hypotheticals in which she argued
the above principles would clearly apply to constrain the offering of
state-sponsored prayers. For example, it would violate the
Establishment Clause if immediately prior to trial, the presiding
judge asked a minister to come forward who then asked the attorneys
and litigants to rise and join him in prayer.84 Why should not a
similar analysis and conclusion apply in the Town of Greece case?
The answer, Justice Kagan suggests, is that the five Justice majority
of the Court believes that this case should be treated differently, and
the Town’s prayer practices upheld, because the tradition of
legislative prayer described and upheld in Marsh requires that
result.85
Justice Kagan emphatically rejected this conclusion. The nature
and process of prayers offered at small town board meetings are so
substantively different than the prayer practice at state legislative
session upheld in Marsh, she argued, that a different analysis applies
that must lead to a different result. Town of Greece is distinct from
Marsh in three critical ways.86 First, members of the public attending
state legislative sessions or sitting in the gallery of Congress are
passive spectators.87 They have no role in the proceedings.88
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1843 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1844.
Id.
See id. at 1842.
See id. at 1845.
See id. at 1847–48.
Id. at 1847.
Id.

Winter 2014]

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

385

Residents attending small town board meetings are there to influence
decision-makers on matters that are important to them.89 “Each and
every aspect of those sessions provides opportunities for Town
residents to interact with public officials. And the most important
parts enable those citizens to petition their government.”90
Second, the prayers upheld in Marsh were directed exclusively
at elected representatives. The prayer practice was an internal
procedure.91 The prayers were delivered to and for the benefit of the
legislature. They were not directed at the gallery or the public at
large.92 In Town of Greece, the intended audience was the residents
gathered for the Board meeting.93 The chaplain stood with his back
to the Town Board, faced the audience, and often asked the audience
to stand, bow their heads and join him in prayer. Even the Court
majority conceded that in asking the audience to “[l]et us all pray
together,” the guest chaplain treated the residents attending the
meeting as if they were part of his congregation.94
Finally, Justice Kagan observed that prayers offered to the
Nebraska legislature in Marsh and the prayers offered at Town of
Greece Board meetings “differ[ed] in their content and character.”95
After complaint from a Jewish lawmaker, the chaplain removed all
references to Christian doctrine from the prayers he offered to the
Nebraska legislature.96 In contrast, Justice Kagan noted, “[N]o one
can fairly read the prayers from Greece’s Town meetings as anything
other than explicitly Christian—constantly and exclusively so.”97
Because the Town of Greece’s prayer practice was not governed
by the Court’s holding in Marsh or the historical tradition on which it
is based, it must be evaluated on its merits and cannot survive basic
Establishment Clause scrutiny. This does not mean that the
Constitution prohibits state-sponsored prayers at small town board
meetings, however. The Town Board could have taken various steps
to avoid running afoul of constitutional requirements. It could have

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1847–48.
See id. at 1848.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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explained to guest chaplains that the Board expected them to offer
nonsectarian prayers that were respectful of religious diversity in the
community. Alternatively, the Town could have invited clergy of
many different faiths to serve as guest chaplains.98 What the Town is
prohibited from doing is arranging for the offering of state-sponsored
prayers in a way that virtually guarantees the alignment of
government with a particular faith.
III. RELIGIOUS EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
The state-sponsored prayer practices the Town of Greece
engaged in substantially burdened religious equality in two distinct,
albeit overlapping, ways. First, the Town discriminated in favor of
established religious congregations and against three groups of
residents: religious minorities with too few adherents to organize a
congregation in the Town; nonaffiliated, spiritual individuals who as
a matter of religious choice decline to join any of the organized
congregations in the community; and non-religious residents.99 Only
clergy from recognized congregations within the Town’s borders
were invited to serve as guest chaplains and offer prayers at the
beginning of Town Board meetings.100 Second, the Town
discriminated in favor of Christianity and against other faiths and
secular belief systems. Over more than a ten-year period, every
prayer-giver at Town Board meetings was a member of the Christian
clergy, except for four exceptions during one year in which
complaints about the Town’s practices were expressed.101
A. Discrimination in Favor of Established Congregations
The first discriminatory practice was blatant and undisputed.
The Town invited clergy from organized congregations within its
boundaries. No one else was even considered as a possible prayergiver.102 While Justice Alito recognizes that religious minorities
98. Id. at 1849.
99. As Judge Calabresi explained, “The town fails to recognize that its residents may hold
religious beliefs that are not represented by a place of worship within the town. Such residents
may be members of congregations in nearby towns or, indeed, may not be affiliated with any
congregation. The town is not a community of religious institutions, but of individual residents,
and, at the least, it must serve those residents without favor or disfavor to any creed or belief.”
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 31 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
100. Id. at 23, 31.
101. See id.
102. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816; id. at 1828 (Alito, J., concurring).
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living in the Town of Greece may worship in houses of worship in
adjoining communities,103 he and the rest of the majority on the
Court are as oblivious to the existence of non-affiliated, spiritual
residents and the need to recognize them in a prayer policy as the
political leaders of the Town of Greece.104
Given the facially discriminatory nature of this practice, there
can be only two possible doctrinal arguments to support the Town’s
selection process. It may be argued that the level of discrimination in
this case does not warrant constitutional attention. Alternatively, it
may be that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit
discrimination between the classes treated differently by the Town’s
prayer practices. The Court appears to support the first argument. It
ignores the second argument entirely.
The Court states repeatedly that the Town of Greece’s practice
was not discriminatory because no one who requested to be
considered as a prayer giver was ever turned down.105 It is also true
however that the Town did absolutely nothing to publicize the fact
that it would be willing to accept requests by residents unaffiliated
with a local congregation to serve as guest chaplains at Town Board
meetings.106 The question of discrimination here is straight-forward.
There are two classes in the Town. One class is comprised of clergy
from organized congregations within the Town’s borders. The other
class is comprised of religious minorities who lack the numbers to
sustain an organized congregation in the Town; nonaffiliated,
spiritual residents of the community; and non-religious residents.
The first class is invited to serve as prayer-givers at Town Board
103. See id. at 1828 (Alito, J., concurring).
104. “The number of Americans who do not identify with any religion continues to grow at a
rapid pace. One-fifth of the U.S. public—and a third of adults under 30—are religiously
unaffiliated today, the highest percentages ever in Pew Research Center polling.” “Nones” on the
Rise, PEW RESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org
/2012/10.09/nones-on-the-rise/.
105. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816; id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
106. See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]n a context where religious minorities exist
and where more could easily have been done to include their participation, the town chose to do
nothing. It could, for example, have posted its policy of permitting anyone to give an invocation
on its website . . . which provides dates and times of upcoming town board meetings along with
minutes of prior meetings. It could have announced inclusive policies at the beginning of its
board meetings, just before introducing the month’s prayer giver. It could have provided
information to those houses of worship of all faiths that lie just outside its borders and include
citizens of Greece among their members. Given that the town could easily have made these or
similar efforts but chose not to, the fact that all of the prayers (aside from the 2008 outliers) were
given by adherents of a single religion reflects a lack of effort to include others.”).
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meetings. Members of the second class are not notified that their
requests to serve as prayer-givers would be considered, much less
accepted. There is, however, an unwritten, unpublicized policy
indicating if they should make such a request, the Town would
accept their request in some fashion. Does this differing treatment
count as discrimination for constitutional purposes?107
I know of no cases on point, but common sense intuitions
strongly suggest that the different treatment of these two classes
constitutes constitutionally cognizable discrimination. Suppose, for
example, the Town of Greece invited white clergy to offer prayers at
town board meetings, but followed an unpublicized policy that the
town would accept the requests of African-American clergy to be
guest chaplains, if any such requests were communicated to it. Does
anyone doubt that this policy constitutes race discrimination? If a
government policy invites Christians to participate in an opportunity,
but requires Jews, Moslems, and members of other minority faiths to
come forward and ask to be included, without providing any notice
that such requests would be honored, would not that policy constitute
religious discrimination on its face? Having one process for the
majority, whether it is whites or Christians, and another process for
minorities surely constitutes discrimination—particularly when the
process for minorities is never publicly disclosed.
Thus, the Court’s repeatedly proclaiming that the Town’s prayer
practice was non-discriminatory seems to be clearly mistaken.108
Perhaps, however, what the Court is actually arguing on this issue is
not that the Town’s practice is free from discrimination but rather
that discrimination in favor of organized congregations and against
less organized religious minorities, the non-affiliated, and nonreligious residents is constitutionally permissible. The Court may

107. It is important to emphasize that the discrimination at issue here is not geographical. It is
discrimination between religious groups organized into congregations and institutions and
religious groups and spiritual individuals that because of their limited numbers or minority beliefs
are not represented by a religious organization in the Town of Greece. No one disputes that
unrepresented religious minorities and non-affiliated individuals live in the Town. The
discrimination question is whether these residents can be treated less favorably than religious
residents who are members of organized congregations.
108. Indeed, the Court’s language seems particularly odd since it insists that the town “would
welcome” religious minorities, the nonaffiliated and non-religious residents, as guest chaplains.
See id. at 1824 (majority opinion). Who feels “welcome” to an event to which other people are
invited while you are admitted only after asking to be allowed in?
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think, although it does not say this explicitly, that treating these
classes differently does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Here, however, we do have a case on point and it fairly
explicitly holds that discrimination between these two classes does
violate the Establishment Clause. In Larson v. Valente,109 the Court
held that, “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.”110 The “denominational preferences” that the Court struck
down in Larson was not a law that facially discriminated against
Jews, Catholics, or some other named faith. It was a law that treated
religious organizations receiving less than 50 percent of their funding
from their members less favorably than religious organizations
receiving more than 50 percent of their funding from their
members.111 Specifically, the Court held that the challenged law
makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between different
religious organizations. We agree with the Court of
Appeals’ observation that the provision effectively
distinguishes between ‘well-established churches’ that have
‘achieved strong but not total financial support from their
members,’ on the one hand, and ‘churches which are new
and lacking in a constituency, or which, as a matter of
policy, may favor public solicitation over general reliance
on financial support from members,’ on the other hand.112
It is difficult to see why the Town of Greece’s policy should not
be similarly construed to constitute prohibited discrimination
between “well-established churches” and “churches which are new
and lacking in a constituency,” or discrimination between
well-established churches and minority religions with too few
adherents to form a congregation within the Town’s borders.113

109. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
110. Id. at 244.
111. See id. at 231–32.
112. Id. at 246 n.23 (quoting Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 456
U.S. 228 (1982)).
113. A non-discriminatory policy, consistent with constitutional guarantees, would not require
equality of effect. The various non-discriminatory invitation arrangements described by Justice
Breyer, see Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting), would almost certainly
result in more members of majority faiths offering prayers than members of minority faiths. If too
many individuals volunteered to offer prayers, the Town would have to prioritize its invitations
based on neutral criteria that did not involve the number, or organizational structure, of adherents

390

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:371

B. Favoring Christian Denominations and Beliefs
The argument that the Town of Greece’s prayer practice
unconstitutionally favored Christianity raises more difficult
questions. Other than four exceptions during one year, for over a
decade only Christian clergy were invited to offer prayers before
Town Board meetings.114 However, plaintiffs abandoned their
argument that the failure to invite non-Christian guest chaplains
involved intentional discrimination,115 and the lower court did not
find that the Town’s decisions were based on “religious animus.”116
It seems clear that the Town of Greece is a predominantly Christian
community.117 This does not suggest that its population is
exclusively Christian. There are allusions in the record to a Buddhist
temple in the Town.118 A leader of a “local Baha’i temple” was one
of the four non-Christians invited to offer prayers on one occasion.119
There are Jewish residents of the Town who worship at synagogues
“not far away” in the adjoining city of Rochester.120 Plaintiffs’
argument in essence, which was accepted in substantial respects by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and Justices Breyer’s and
Kagan’s dissent, was that the process by which the Town of Greece
selected clergy and the sectarian content of many of the prayers
offered during Town Board meetings demonstrated that the Town
aligned itself with the Christian faith.121 Non-Christians were treated
as if they did not exist or were unworthy of notice. Neither their
identity nor their beliefs were taken into account by the Town’s
prayer practices. The fact that a town is predominantly of one faith
does not justify government conduct that suggests that this is the
only faith or system of beliefs that matters.
The Court’s response to this argument is varied. Justice
Kennedy argued that the Town need not seek guest chaplains from
in the community, but that would still in all likelihood result in a predominant number of guest
chaplains from larger faiths.
114. See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.
115. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014).
116. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring); Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32.
117. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 24.
119. See id. at 23; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 13–15.
120. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1828 (Alito, J., concurring).
121. See id. at 1838–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 1851 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondents, supra note 3, at 15, 21–23.
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houses of worship outside its borders in order to create a more
diversified pool of prayer-givers.122 Justice Alito disagreed. His
concurrence indicates that that the failure to include synagogues
from neighboring communities would be unacceptable if their
exclusion was a matter of deliberate policy.123 The Town’s failure to
include the adjoining synagogues and the Buddhist temple in this
case did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was a result
of an informal, imprecise process involving petty functionaries who
were provided insufficient guidance by the Board. This admittedly
sloppy process was a far cry from invidious discrimination.124 Both
Justices seem to think that in light of the predominantly Christian
population of the community, the failure to invite non-Christian
clergy as guest chaplains or to include any message in the prayer
program acknowledging non-Christian residents or their beliefs was
basically no big deal.125
The Court’s analysis is seriously problematic for several
reasons, both in terms of doctrine and the practical consequences of
its decision. As a practical matter, Justice Kennedy’s contention that
a town can simply ignore the fact that minority residents worship at
houses of worship in adjoining communities is a virtual recipe for
religious discrimination. Outside of large cities it is commonplace for
religious minorities who live in several small towns in an area to
establish a congregation and house of worship in one town to serve
the spiritual needs of the residents of several communities.126 Under
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, no town in the area other than the one in
which the house of worship is located has any obligation to invite
religious minority residents to participate in the state-sponsored
prayers offered at town meetings. I am at a loss to identify any virtue
in such an approach that is so unnecessarily insensitive to the needs
of religious minorities who do not live in metropolitan areas.

122. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
123. See id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1824 (majority opinion), 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
126. Alan Brownstein, Town of Greece v. Galloway: Constitutional Challenges to StateSponsored Prayers at Local Government Meetings, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1521, 1532 (2014)
[hereinafter Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers].

392

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:371

1. The Unconstitutionality of Vesting Decisions About Religion
in the Unguided Discretion of Petty Officials
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court’s apparent conclusion
that the lack of guidelines provided to lower level functionaries in
inviting guest chaplains and the informal, imprecise nature of the
selection process somehow mitigates constitutional concerns or
immunizes decisions from meaningful constitutional review is
nothing short of extraordinary. When other rights are at issue and
decisions are being made with constitutionally-salient values at
stake, the courts have emphatically demanded that government
operate under carefully structured and transparent guidelines to limit
the risk of biased decision-making. Leaving decisions to
inadequately guided petty functionaries has always been considered a
constitutional violation, not a shield for discriminatory results.
In freedom of speech cases, for example, the courts’ willingness
to strike down vague and overbroad laws reflects in part the concern
that imprecise and indeterminate standards in regulations that may
apply to speech risk and invite “discriminatory enforcement.”127
Plaintiffs need not prove that discrimination actually occurred to
support a constitutional challenge in these cases.128 It is sufficient to
demonstrate that government officials were given the “unbridled
discretion” to determine whether specific speech warranted sanction.
Thus, in City of Houston v. Hill,129 for example, the city argued
unsuccessfully that its ordinance “mak[ing] it unlawful to interrupt a
police officer in the performance of his or her duties”130 did not
violate the First Amendment because there was “no evidence that the
city has applied the ordinance to chill particular speakers or
ideas.”131 Despite the lack of evidence of actual discrimination, the
Court struck down the ordinance because of the unguided discretion
it conferred on the police officers who enforced it.132
127. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 71–72 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting that vague and overbroad laws are constitutionally problematic
because they chill protected speech and create a “risk of discriminatory enforcement”).
128. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615–16 (1971) (reversing convictions of
ordinance prohibiting conduct on public sidewalks annoying to persons passing by without the
Court knowing details of defendants’ conduct because vague and overbroad ordinance is “an
obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement”).
129. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
130. Id. at 453.
131. Id. at 459.
132. See id. at 466–67.
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The same concerns about the dangers of unguided discretion and
the risk of bias should apply when religion rather than speech is at
issue. Judge Posner in reviewing a RLUIPA case involving a
statutory challenge to the denial of a church’s rezoning petition noted
“the vulnerability of religious institutions—especially those that are
not affiliated with the mainstream Protestant sects or the Roman
Catholic Church—to subtle forms of discrimination when, as in the
case of the grant or denial of zoning variances, a state delegates
essentially standardless discretion to nonprofessionals operating
without procedural safeguards.”133 A similar concern should apply in
Town of Greece. Put simply, we do not trust the government when it
operates without standards in regulating speech or choosing among
religious faiths.
The Court has also made it clear that the operation of any
licensing or permit system imposed on expressive activities cannot
be left to the discretion of a government official or functionary.
Instead, the government must “establish neutral criteria to insure that
the licensing decision is not based on the content or viewpoint of the
speech being considered.”134 These standards are not only a critical
tool for preventing discriminatory decisions because they directly
limit official discretion. They are also essential to meaningful
judicial review of alleged official censorship of unpopular ideas. As
the Court in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.135
explained,
[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to
distinguish, “as applied,” between a licensor’s legitimate
denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial
power. Standards provide the guideposts that check the
licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine
whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored
speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations
by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for
courts to determine in any particular case whether the

133. Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d
895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005).
134. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988).
135. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing
unfavorable, expression.136
Justices Kennedy and Alito characterize the Town of Greece’s
process for inviting guest chaplains as imprecise and informal. A
more accurate description would note that the Town never adopted a
policy for inviting clergy prior to the commencement of this
litigation and left the invitation decisions to employees who, over
time, “developed a more or less standard procedure.”137 There were
no guidelines provided to the low level functionaries charged with
inviting prayer-givers. These town employees exercised their own
discretion in compiling a list of potential guest chaplains and in
determining which clergy on the list to invite. The Town never
adopted the kind of neutral criteria necessary to avoid biased
decisions. Further, given the ad hoc nature of the invitation process,
it is hardly surprising that plaintiffs could not prove intentional
discrimination, notwithstanding the continuing invitation of
exclusively Christian clergy for over a decade.138 Juxtaposing the
unguided discretion and lack of formal guidelines in this case with
the standards required in free speech cases makes the Court’s
apparent acquiescence to the Town of Greece’s invitation process
hard to justify and accept.139
136. Id. at 758.
137. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014).
138. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1852 n.5 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (wondering how Town Board members could fail to notice that the sectarian prayers
offered included only Christian content and were delivered exclusively by Christian clergy).
139. Justice Alito expressed his concerns about small towns, such as the Town of Greece,
being held to ambiguous and uncertain constitutional standards, implying that they should be
given some leeway in their struggles to do the right thing when dealing with the intersection of
church and state. See id. at 1831–32 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito is certainly correct that
the Establishment Clause case law in this area has hardly been a model of clarity. See id. at 1831;
Brownstein, State-sponsored Prayer, supra note 126, at 1523–28. But, Justice Alito has
demonstrated no such concern about local government officials or employees dealing with
ambiguous and indeterminate standards when other constitutional guarantees are at issue. It
would be hard to identify an area of constitutional law where the standards are more opaque and
difficult to apply than the free speech rights of public school students. See, e.g., B.H. ex rel.
Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 302 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting from numerous
cases describing the incoherence and complexity of free speech jurisprudence as it relates to
public school student expression); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2011)
(granting qualified immunity to school principal because determining when it is permissible to
restrict student speech “requires recourse to a complicated body of law that seeks, often clumsily,
to balance a number of competing First Amendment imperatives”); Alan Brownstein, The
NonForum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech
Cases Involving School Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 719–84 (2009).
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2. Explicit and Implicit Disparagement
What else does the Court offer to defend its conclusion that the
Town of Greece’s practices do not violate religious equality
principles mandated by the Establishment Clause? In part, the Court
seems to suggest that the continued offering of sectarian Christian
prayers to begin Town Board meetings are consistent with religious
equality values as long as the prayers do not involve a pattern or
practice of prayers disparaging and denigrating religious minorities
and non-religious residents.140 Having to listen to a sectarian prayer
offered by clergy of the majority faith shows no disrespect to
religious minorities or non-religious residents. Thus, there is no
constitutionally cognizable burden on religious equality in this
case.141
Here, the Court appears to misunderstand the primary thrust of
plaintiffs’ equality argument. A sectarian prayer of the majority faith
is not disparaging of minority faiths or non-religious residents. It is
exclusionary in an important sense, however. A prayer to Jesus
Christ, Our Lord and Savior, is not a prayer that reflects the beliefs,
or serves the spiritual needs, of Jews, Moslems or Buddhists. What is
disparaging and disrespectful is that neither the content of these
prayers or the Town’s selection process for inviting guest chaplains
recognized the existence of non-Christians in the community in any
way. There are various approaches the Town could have adopted to
demonstrate some awareness of religious pluralism in its
community—I will discuss these remedial alternatives later in this
Article—but the key point is that the Town took no steps to
demonstrate any awareness of its non-Christian residents.142 As

Because teachers and school administrative officials have to make speech discriminatory
decisions every day in the regular course of performing their professional duties, the rigorous
enforcement of student free speech rights places extremely heavy burdens on school authorities.
Yet, Justice Alito has been insistent that the federal courts must carefully monitor teacher and
administrative decisions that implicate speech. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422–
25 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (Alito, J., dissenting). Here, unlike Town of Greece, Justice Alito has demonstrated little if
any concern about local officials and employees beleaguered by uncertain constitutional
standards.
140. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825–26.
141. See id. at 1827–28.
142. Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 1850–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Galloway, 681 F.3d
at 31.
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plaintiffs argued succinctly, the Town “gave the consciences of
religious minorities no thought at all.”143 That is disparaging.
Put simply, plaintiffs raised a powerful religious equality
challenge to the Town of Greece’s prayer practices. The Town’s
practices were facially discriminatory in inviting guest chaplains to
offer prayers before Town Board meetings. The Town vested
discretionary authority in petty officials and provided them
inadequate guidelines for making decisions that risked being skewed
by religious bias and favoritism. Whether acting deliberately or
otherwise, the Town ignored the interests and needs of non-Christian
residents of the community. As noted above, the Court did not
provide persuasive specific responses to any of these challenges. It
did offer one overriding general response, however. The Town’s
practices constituted legislative prayer. Legislative prayer was a
historically recognized practice from the beginning of our
constitutional system, and it was explicitly upheld as constitutional at
the national and state legislative level in Marsh in 1983.144 To the
Court, there was nothing about the Town of Greece case that
distinguished it from Marsh. The same history and tradition that
justified upholding the legislative prayer practice of the Nebraska
legislature in Marsh required the Court to uphold the prayer practices
of the Town of Greece.145
3. The Relevance and Controlling Authority of Marsh
The Court’s reliance on the tradition of legislative prayer and the
Marsh decision is not easily defended, however. First, there is debate
as to whether the tradition supporting legislative prayer and the
Marsh decision covers a consistent pattern of sectarian prayers.146
Second, and much more importantly, there were numerous,
constitutionally-salient differences that distinguished state-sponsored
prayers at the state legislative level or before Congress and state
sponsored prayers before local government meetings, such as a town
board meeting. I will address most of these distinctions in the section
143. Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 36.
144. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
145. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (“The Court’s inquiry, then, must be to
determine whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”); id. at 1833–34 (Alito, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., Brief for Paul Finkelman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Town
of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (No. 12-696); Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 41–47.
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of this Article dealing with religious liberty and coercion. But it is
important to note here that the essential identity of legislative prayer
before state and national legislative sessions and legislative prayer
before town board meetings is critical to the Court’s analysis and
holding. As Justice Kennedy concedes, there was no evidence in the
record before the Court of any pervasive tradition of state sponsored
prayer before local government meetings.147 The historical evidence
on which the Court relied applied to prayers before Congress and
state legislatures.148 If prayers before town board meetings raised
distinctive constitutional questions that differentiated these cases
from Establishment Clause challenges to state and congressional
prayer practices, the Court could not rely on either history and
long-standing tradition or the precedent of Marsh to respond to
plaintiffs’ powerful religious equality arguments.
As plaintiffs and the dissenting Justices argued, there are
substantial and salient differences between the nature and setting of
legislative prayer upheld in Marsh and the setting and prayer practice
challenged in Town of Greece.149 The legislative prayer upheld in
Marsh was an internal legislative procedure directed at the legislative
body itself, not at the public-at-large or audience members in the
gallery. The prayers at issue in Town of Greece were directed at the
members of the public attending the meeting.150 This distinction has
substantial historical relevance. Whether the tradition of legislative
chaplains offering prayers before state legislatures or Congress
included a pattern of sectarian prayers or not, a different tradition,
limiting state-sponsored religious expression to relatively
non-sectarian messages, applied to state-sponsored religious
messages directed to the public. As even Justice Scalia, surely no fan
of a rigorously enforced Establishment Clause, acknowledged,
[O]ur constitutional tradition, from the Declaration of
Independence and the first inaugural address of
Washington . . . down to the present day, has, with a few
aberrations, ruled out of order government-sponsored
endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is
147. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
148. See id. at 1823–25; id. at 1829–30, 1833–34 (Alito, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1847–49 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 41–48.
150. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1847–48 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondents, supra note 3, at 43.
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sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men
and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent
Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for
example, the divinity of Christ).151
Plaintiffs relied on this tradition restricting government religious
speech to the public to non-sectarian messages and emphasized
Justice Scalia’s recognition of this historical account in their briefs
and oral argument.152
The response to these arguments by Justices Scalia and Kennedy
are as bewildering as they are disturbing. Justice Scalia simply
ignores the statements in his prior opinions and says nothing to
reconcile his upholding of sectarian prayers in this case with his
repeated recognition of the tradition of non-sectarian state sponsored
religious messages directed at citizens. Justice Kennedy argues that
the “principal audience” for the prayers offered by guest chaplains at
Town Board meetings in the Town of Greece is “not . . . the public
but [the] lawmakers themselves.”153
To put it bluntly, this contention makes no sense. It suggests an
understanding of social reality that bears little resemblance to the
experience and perception of real people. Here, as will also be
discussed infra in the section of this Article discussing religious
liberty and coercion concerns, Justice Kennedy seems so determined
to squeeze square facts into round doctrinal holes that he asserts
factual inferences that have no support other than that they are a
necessary foundation for his legal conclusions. If accepted history
and Establishment Clause doctrine only permit state-sponsored
sectarian prayers when such prayers are directed internally to the
members of the legislature, then Justice Kennedy will construe the
prayers offered at the Town of Greece Board meetings to be directed
at the Town’s Board Members, notwithstanding the counter-factual
nature of this conclusion.
The guest chaplain at Town of Greece Board meetings stood
with his back to the Board and faced the audience of town residents.
Frequently, the prayer-giver asked the audience to stand, bow their
151. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
152. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 33, 47–50; Transcript of Oral Argument at
32:1–7, 45:15–23, Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (No. 12-696), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-696_i4ep.pdf.
153. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
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heads and join in the prayer. Audience members responded by doing
so—demonstrating that they fully understood the guest chaplain’s
prayers to be directed at them.154 The chaplain commonly prayed in
the name of the audience155—treating residents attending the board
meeting as if they were members of his own congregation.156 Yet,
Justice Kennedy insists that the prayers offered at Town Board
meetings were directed to the Board members sitting behind the
guest chaplain and not to the public audience he was so obviously
addressing.
Yet another perplexing aspect of the Court’s reliance on Marsh
to respond to plaintiffs’ religious equality arguments is the stark
dissonance between the prayer-practice upheld in Marsh and the
constitutional requirements the Court appears to require for the Town
of Greece’s state-sponsored prayers. The Court repeatedly justifies
its holding in Town of Greece on the condition that the Town’s
selection of chaplains was not discriminatory and included a rotation
of all the faiths in the community seeking to participate in this
opportunity.157 In Marsh, however, there was no such open invitation
or rotating procedure. The same paid Protestant chaplain offered the
prayers before the legislature for eighteen years, yet the Court saw no
problem with such denominational exclusivity. Lower courts have
read Marsh as permitting at least some level of denominational
discrimination in choosing prayer-givers at local government
meetings.158 If Marsh is controlling precedent, why does the Court
insist that town boards cannot discriminate on the basis of religious
belief and affiliation in inviting guest chaplains to offer prayers
before meetings? The Court’s opinion provides no answer to this
question.

154. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 11.
155. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 24, 32 (2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014).
156. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826.
157. See supra note 105.
158. See, e.g., Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir.
2005) (upholding selection procedure that excludes members of Wicca religion from list of clergy
eligible to be invited to offer prayers at county board meetings under the authority of Marsh).
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IV. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND COERCION
A. The Salient Distinctions Relating to Coercion Between
Prayers at Local Board Meetings and Prayers
Before Congress or a State Legislature
The issue of coercion and the protection of religious liberty
played two distinct, but overlapping, roles in the Town of Greece
dispute and decision. First, to the extent that the setting of prayer
practices in the Town of Greece raised concerns about coercion that
were not present when prayers are offered before state legislatures or
Congress, the holding in Marsh and the historical tradition on which
it is based would be distinguishable from the present case and would
not control its analysis. Second, as even Justice Kennedy concedes,
government coercion of religious exercise violates the Establishment
Clause.159 It is an unacceptable abridgement of religious liberty for
government to coerce participation in worship services.
The Marsh decision did not focus on the coercion of members of
the public viewing sessions of the state legislature or Congress from
the gallery. There was little reason for it to do so. As noted
previously, the prayers offered before the Nebraska legislative
sessions upheld in Marsh were internal matters directed to the
legislators, not the public. Of equal if not greater importance, visitors
in the gallery of state legislative sessions are there as passive
observers. Legislators are rarely aware of their identity or their
presence. There is no interaction between the public and
decision-makers.160
Even in the extremely unlikely event that a member of the
legislature noticed a specific visitor’s conduct while a prayer was
being offered, the legislator would have no basis for identifying the
visitor or associating him or her with any matter being discussed by
the legislature. Further, if a state legislator or member of Congress
somehow did recognize a visitor who, for example, failed to stand
while a prayer was offered, and somehow knew the visitor’s position
on some bill before the legislature, it is hardly conceivable that the
legislator would allow one’s person’s conduct to influence a broad
policy decision impacting the lives of thousands or tens of thousands

159. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826–27.
160. See id. at 1847–48 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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of other persons. There is nothing intrinsically coercive of the public
when prayers are offered before state legislatures or Congress.
The situation is entirely different when prayers are offered at a
small town board meeting. Most of what Congress or a state
legislature does involves the formulation and enactment of general
laws that impact large groups and constituencies. By contrast, town
boards regularly deal with issues affecting small groups and
individuals. Land use decisions impact individual parcel owners and
specific neighborhoods. Budget decisions may burden particular
small constituencies. Sometimes town boards act as administrative
tribunals in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity, hearing personnel
grievances or zoning appeals. Thus, these local government meetings
are much more likely to be focused on the needs and interests of
individuals than are a state legislature’s sessions. The distinction
between legislative, administrative, and executive action often has
little utility and meaning at town board meetings.
More importantly, citizens who watch the deliberations of
Congress or a state legislature from the gallery are passive observers.
They have no role to play in the legislative process. They are no
more involved in the government’s decisions than viewers who
watch the legislature’s sessions at home on CSPAN.
Citizens who attend town board meetings are not passive
witnesses of government operations. They attend board meetings to
participate in government by speaking to the board during public
comment periods. They expect to be seen and heard by the board.
Their goal is to influence decision-makers. Their ability to address
the board in person, to tell the board their side of the story, is an
important right of political participation.
Finally, outside of major metropolitan areas, there are
substantial differences between the size and format of state and
national legislative chambers and town board meeting rooms. State
legislators and members of Congress rarely know who is sitting in
the gallery. The size of the chambers and the number of legislators
and visitors preclude any such knowledge or sense of familiarity.
The small meeting rooms of town board sessions are different. Here,
the physical proximity between the board and the audience, and the
limited number of participants, make it far easier for board members
to be aware of their audience.
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Because of these differences, the decision in Marsh tells us very
little about the coercive nature of government-sponsored prayer at
town board meetings. In the setting of a town board meeting, citizens
are coerced when they are asked to stand or otherwise affirm the
prayer that is being offered in their name. A failure to comply would
risk alienating the very political decision-makers whom they hope to
influence.
Town residents speaking at meetings know that the board’s
decisions will often involve substantial political discretion in
weighing the competing concerns of relatively small constituencies.
Residents will justly fear that if they refuse to join in prayers offered
by clergy invited by the board, the board will respond less favorably
to their needs and concerns than it will to other speakers in the
audience who do join in the offered prayers.161
B. What Constitutes Coercion
Plaintiffs’ coercion arguments here could hardly be more
persuasive or more compelling. When government officials are
empowered to exercise discretionary authority over individuals, these
officials, directly or through invited clergy, cannot “request” that
individuals dependent on the way that power is exercised join the
officials in prayer before a decision of importance to the individual is
reached. The invitation to pray in such circumstances is intrinsically
coercive. To emphasize this point, Justice Kagan uses the example of
a trial judge inviting a minister into the courtroom who asks the
litigants to rise while he expresses a sectarian prayer.162
161. Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra note 126, at 1530–31.
162. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The focus of Justice
Kagan’s powerful dissenting opinion is religious equality, not religious liberty. Her primary
concern is the alignment of the state with a particular religion, not with the coercive impact of the
Town of Greece’s prayer practices on residents attending town board meetings. Many of the
examples and arguments she offers, however, seem to reflect concerns about coercion as much as
they do concerns about religious equality. Indeed, in reading Justice Kagan’s dissent one often
expects an argument describing a coercive context to conclude by identifying the situation as one
that abridges religious liberty by unconstitutionally coercing participation in religion exercise. At
the last minute, however, Justice Kagan seems to shift gears and describes the problem in
religious equality terms. Consider this paragraph in her dissent:
A person goes to court, to the polls, to a naturalization ceremony—and a government
official or his hand-picked minister asks her, as the first order of official business, to
stand and pray with others in a way conflicting with her own religious beliefs. Perhaps
she feels sufficient pressure to go along—to rise, bow her head, and join in whatever
others are saying: After all, she wants, very badly, what the judge or poll worker or
immigration official has to offer. Or perhaps she is made of stronger mettle, and she
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Similar coercive circumstances arise when an individual seeks a
determination of his or her eligibility for benefits from a government
bureaucrat or when a small town legislature deliberates on a matter
of particular importance to a small group of residents. The pressure
to comply with the invitation to rise and join in the offered prayer
should be obvious to anyone. But it is not obvious to the Court.
Justice Kennedy acknowledges, as he must, that coercing
participation in religious exercise violates the Establishment
Clause.163 He also recognizes, correctly, that an inquiry into coercion
is “a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the
prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”164 In
conducting that inquiry, however, Justice Kennedy ignores important
facts and circumstances. More egregiously, his description of the
social reality and facts he does discuss is implausible at best. In an
effort to be charitable, I can only say that it is a description of reality
that neither I nor anyone I know shares or understands.
1. Prayers by Guest Chaplains Are No Less Coercive
than Prayers by Board Members
As noted, the Justice Kennedy begins his attempt to refute
plaintiffs’ coercion claims by arguing that the prayers offered by
guest chaplains at Town Board meetings were directed at the Board
members, not the town residents attending Board meetings. That
distorted characterization of the prayer practices at Town of Greece
Board meetings is only the first of Justice Kennedy’s, let us say,
unusual understandings of the facts and circumstances of this case.
Justice Kennedy also emphasizes that it is guest chaplains rather than
Board members themselves who direct audience members to rise,

opts not to participate in what she does not believe—indeed, what would, for her, be
something like blasphemy. She then must make known her dissent from the common
religious view, and place herself apart from other citizens, as well as from the officials
responsible for the invocations. And so a civic function of some kind brings religious
differences to the fore: That public proceeding becomes (whether intentionally or not)
an instrument for dividing her from adherents to the community’s majority religion,
and for altering the very nature of her relationship with her government.
Id. at 1844. I do not doubt that these examples raise serious religious equality concerns. It seems
odd, however, to discuss these hypotheticals solely in terms of how they divide people from each
other on religious grounds while ignoring the burden on religious liberty they impose on
minorities by pressuring them to join in the majority’s religious exercise.
163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
164. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
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bow their heads, and join in the offered prayers.165 While this is true,
it is hard to understand why Justice Kennedy believes that it
mitigates in any way the coercive nature of these requests.
Plaintiffs argue that if a citizen is seeking benefits or actions
from a deliberative body or government official who has the
discretionary authority to make decisions that will seriously impact
the citizen’s wellbeing, it is intrinsically coercive for the citizen to be
asked to engage in a religious exercise such as a prayer before
submitting his request to the government decision-maker. The
government decision-maker could be a public employer evaluating
job applicants, or determining promotions. It could be a teacher
supervising and evaluating public school students. It could be a judge
presiding over a trial. Or it could be a town board making
administrative and legislative decisions involving small groups in the
community or individual residents. In all of these examples, if the
employer, teacher, judge, or board in their official capacity asks
citizens to pray, the request is intrinsically coercive. Citizens will
naturally feel pressured to comply in order to avoid alienating
government decision-makers who have so much discretionary
authority over the citizen’s interests. In these circumstances why
would anyone think that there is a distinction between the town
board members asking the audience to stand and pray and the invited
clergy offering the prayer directing them to do so? If a judge,
employer or teacher invited clergy to offer a prayer and litigants and
counsel, employees, and students were directed by the invited clergy
to pray, the coercive nature of the circumstance would not be
significantly reduced.
2. Coercion Exists Without Explicit Threats
or Formal Penalties
Even if the Town Board itself rather than the invited clergy
directed audience members to rise, bow their heads, and join in
prayer, the Court seems to suggest that such requests would still not
constitute unconstitutional coercion. Justices Thomas and Scalia
clearly would reach this conclusion. From their perspective, religious
coercion is only constitutionally problematic if it is imposed “by

165. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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force of law and threat of penalty.”166 Implicit coercion has no
constitutional significance for these Justices. Presumably, they would
have found no constitutionally problematic coercion in the various
hypotheticals involving prayer requests described in Justice Kagan’s
dissent.167
Some of the language in Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to
echo this position. He appears to reject plaintiffs’ coercion claims
because Board members never told residents that the Board’s
decision “might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the
prayer opportunity.”168 Similarly, he explains, “Nothing in the record
indicates that town leaders allocated benefits and burdens based on
participation in the prayer, or that citizens were received differently
depending on whether they joined the invocation or quietly
declined.”169 This suggests that Justices Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito
agree with Justices Thomas and Scalia that there must be an actual
threat of penalty or imposition of a penalty (or denial of benefits) for
claims of religious coercion to be upheld.
Other language suggests a more fact-based understanding of
Justice Kennedy’s argument. Here, Justice Kennedy does not appear
to be insisting, as do Justices Thomas and Scalia, that as a matter of
law, coercion must be imposed by explicit threats or penalties. He is
arguing as a matter of fact and social reality that without explicit
threats or a history of the sanctioning of dissidents audience
members cannot reasonably claim to feel pressured by the prayer
practices they challenge. Pursuant to Justice Kennedy’s
understanding of human behavior, “Should nonbelievers choose to
exit the room during a prayer they find distasteful, their absence will
not stand out as disrespectful or even noteworthy. And should they
remain, their quiet acquiescence will not, in light of our traditions, be
interpreted as an agreement with the words or ideas expressed.”170
Thus, Justice Kennedy suggests that implied coercion might exist in
some circumstance, but not in this one.
Once again, it is hard to make sense of observations about social
reality that bear so little resemblance to the world I experience.
166. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1837 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
167. See id. at 1842–43 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1826 (majority opinion).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1827.
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Given the small number of residents in the audience of small town
meetings (typically ten or less at the Town of Greece’s meetings), I
would expect that anyone who stood up and walked out during a
prayer would be immediately noticed. They would have every reason
to worry that their conduct would be considered disrespectful and
that the board would be negatively influenced by their behavior.
Would anyone seriously advise a friend or colleague planning on
addressing a small town board meeting on an important matter that
they should have no concerns or inhibitions about standing up and
leaving the room during a prayer they found objectionable because
no one would notice or be upset by their behavior?
The intrinsic coercion in the Town of Greece’s prayer practice is
an unavoidable result of the Board’s discretionary power and the
obvious value it assigns to the offering of prayers to begin its
meetings. In such circumstances, the normal response of an
individual subject to an official’s exercise of discretionary power
would be to worry that a failure to comply with a “request” to pray
would adversely influence the official’s decisions in a way that
would be detrimental to the individual’s needs and interests. This is
the common understanding when participation in prayer is requested
by school authorities. Thus, for example, when a public high school
coach asked team members to kneel, or stand and bow their heads at
prayers offered during team dinners and in the locker room, it is
hardly surprising that dissident students would feel pressure to
participate because they “would not want to disappoint the coach” or
that a student would fear “that if he did not go along with what was
obviously the coach’s desire, he would not get playing time.”171
Similar concerns about coercion arise when citizens seek the
discretionary assistance of public employees and are confronted with
requests to join the employee in prayer. Accordingly, courts have
upheld regulations prohibiting a state social worker from sharing his
faith with clients and praying with them on the job. Clients go to the
171. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 182 (3rd Cir. 2008) (McKee, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). In another example, a high school teacher
publicly chastised a student for refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In holding that the
teacher violated the student’s First Amendment rights, the court explained: “Given the gross
disparity in power between a teacher and a student, such comments . . . coming from an authority
figure with tremendous discretionary authority . . . cannot help but have a tremendous chilling
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370
F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004).
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offices of the Department of Social Services to “seek assistance”
from “an agent of the state.” If the social worker from whom they
seek assistance asks them to pray, “they may well be motivated to
seeks ways to ingratiate themselves” with the state’s agent.172
Intrinsic coercion is also easily recognized in the relationship
between supervisors and public employees. OPM Guidelines on
Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal
Workplace state:
Because supervisors have the power to hire, fire, or
promote, employees may reasonably perceive their
supervisors’ religious expression as coercive, even if it was
not intended as such. Therefore, supervisors should be
careful to ensure that their statements and actions are such
that employees do not perceive any coercion of religious or
non-religious behavior (or respond as if such coercion is
occurring), and should, where necessary, take appropriate
steps to dispel such misperceptions.173
This common sense understanding of implicit compulsion and the
reasonable fear of consequences for failing to comply is recognized
in so many settings and circumstances that it is difficult to
understand Justice Kennedy’s contention that it does not exist in the
chambers of a town board meeting.
3. Competing Traditions as to the Meaning of Coerced Attendance
at Prayers and Standing During Prayers
In refuting plaintiffs’ religious coercion claims, Justice Kennedy
also seems to suggest that plaintiffs are not being required to do
anything of religious or expressive significance. He contends that “in
light of our traditions” involving legislative prayer, no one would
think that an audience member standing up (and perhaps bowing his
head) while the prayer was expressed was joining in the prayer.174
On its face, this seems to be obviously wrong. A member of the
clergy treats the audience as if it was the congregation at his house of
worship.175 He asks the audience to rise and bow their heads and
172. Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 447 F.3d 642, 650–51 (9th Cir. 2006).
173. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Guidelines on Religious
Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace (Aug. 14, 1997), reprinted in CCH
INC., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE ¶ 3814 (2014).
174. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
175. See id. at 1826.
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pray with him.176 The prayer he offers is in the name of the
audience.177 Everyone in the room rises in response to the
prayer-giver’s request. Most do so for the express purpose of joining
in the prayer. Why would anyone think that a particular person rising
and bowing his head in such circumstances is not joining in the
prayer?
Justice Kennedy’s answer is that because of the tradition of
legislative prayer, it is common knowledge that the expression of
prayer in this circumstance serves a secular, ceremonial, solemnizing
purpose.178 Standing and bowing one’s head is understood to reflect
respect for that tradition and the function it serves. It does not
involve religious exercise or signify participation in the prayer being
offered. As Justice Kagan suggests, the Court acts as if by mere
reference to the tradition of legislative prayer, it can transform
sectarian “statements of profound belief and deep meaning” that go
to “a core aspect of [a person’s] identity” into mere ceremony.179
Justice Kennedy reads far too much into the alleged tradition he
describes. First, as a general rule, people do communicate
acquiescence to a message when they stand while it is expressed.
When people stand when the national anthem is played before a
sporting event begins, most would explain their conduct as an
expression of patriotism that is shared by the entire audience.
Second, jurors and scholars seriously dispute the meaning and scope
of the tradition he describes. Indeed, plaintiffs and the dissenting
Justices emphatically dispute the extension of this tradition to small
town board meetings.180 Accordingly, it is hardly clear that
laypersons in the audience are so familiar with Justice Kennedy’s
interpretation of this tradition that it colors their understanding of the
prayer practice sponsored by the Town Board. Third, the idea that
the content of the prayer is irrelevant to audience members in the
context of legislative prayers because they are simply standing to
show respect for tradition and the beliefs of others cannot be
grounded in the facts of Marsh. Under Justice Kennedy’s analysis, it
would make little sense for Jewish legislators to tell the legislative
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra notes 40 and 60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
Id. at 1853 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1851–52; Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22.
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chaplain in Nebraska that his praying in Christ’s name was a matter
of concern to them. Yet the Court in Marsh understood these
requests, and the Chaplain’s response of making the prayers more
generic, to be perfectly reasonable, whether or not the response was
constitutionally required.181
a. American tradition rejects coerced attendance at prayers
Fourth and most importantly, Justice Kennedy completely
ignores two other American traditions that compete with the tradition
of legislative prayer. These alternative traditions would color the
understanding of the prayer practice at town board meetings and
suggest that the tradition of legislative prayer should be construed
cautiously and narrowly. One tradition is historical. Americans from
the colonial period onward have insisted on their right to control
their decisions as to the religious congregation they will join, the
services they will attend, and the clergy with whom they will
worship.182 As Michael Paulsen argues in his defense of the Court’s
holding in Lee v. Weisman striking down state-sponsored prayers at
public school graduations,183 focusing on the public’s historical
acceptance of state-sponsored prayers to solemnize public events and
activities only tells one half of the story. “[T]he evidence is also clear
that compelled attendance at a religious worship service was
regarded as one of the defining characteristics (and most hated
features) of religious establishments.”184
As Paulsen explains, “government induced attendance at a
prayer ceremony violates this historical principle.”185 Nor should the
brevity of the event excuse this constitutional violation. “Surely,”
Paulsen concludes, “the state could not compel attendance at a tenminute Mass or a five-minute sermon.”186 Yet Justice Kennedy’s
181. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791–95 (1983).
182. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 21
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 201, 233–36, 241–45 (2013); ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (1744), reprinted in AM. HERITAGE SERIES, THE
GREAT AWAKENING 323, 326–29 (Alan Heimert & Perry Miller eds., 1967). The Court’s opinion
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702–03 (2012) reflects some recognition of how important it was to
colonists and the Framers for individuals to be free to choose the clergy with whom they would
choose to pray.
183. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992).
184. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 828 (1993).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 829.
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opinion reads as if American resistance to the use of government
power to influence attendance and participation at prayer services or
the selection of clergy leading worship had no place in our
constitutional tradition. To the contrary, it is this tradition of
challenges to government induced attendance at prayer ceremonies
and government involvement in the selection of clergy that must
serve as the compelling backdrop behind which the more limited
tradition of legislative prayer should be understood.
b. Prayer is a personal, meaningful communication
between the individual and G-d
The other tradition is cultural and religious, and it substantially
predates any use of prayer to begin legislative sessions. For many if
not most Americans, prayer is a personal, meaningful
communication between the person expressing the prayer and G-d.187
It is not an abstract or rote means of solemnizing secular activities.
As Judge John Noonan explains, through religious exercise and
prayer “[h]eart speaks to heart. . . . [and it expresses] the living
communication between believer and God” that is the essence of
religion.188 In reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion, one searches in
vain for any recognition of the meaning religious people assign to
prayer or how foreign his description of legislative prayer is to that
more basic understanding of what prayer is. Legislative prayer, it
seems, involves everything except what prayer is conventionally
recognized to be—a heartfelt, personal communication between men
and women and G-d.189 When people are asked to pray and a
187. See, e.g., Kevin L. Ladd & Daniel N. McIntosh, Meaning, God, and Prayer: Physical
and Metaphysical Aspects of Social Support, 11 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & CULTURE 23, 29
(2008) (defining prayer as the “intentional expression of one’s self in an attempt to establish or
enhance connectivity with the divine, with others in a religious or spiritual framework, and with
the self”).
188. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1–2 (1998).
189. To Jews, for example, “prayer is our way of communicating with God.” REUVEN
HAMMER, ENTERING JEWISH PRAYER: A GUIDE TO PERSONAL DEVOTION AND THE WORSHIP
SERVICE 3 (1994). More specifically, “[p]rayer is the conscious expression of [our] relationship
[with God], the moments and hours we devote exclusively to developing that connection:
addressing ourselves to God, speaking about God, listening to the words of God.” Id. at 6. One
Christian author describes prayer this way. “When we pray, we use words (spoken out loud or
silently) and gestures to express what we believe about God and how we think about our
relationship to God and to one another. In prayer, we communicate how God is active and present
to us. In faith, we pray, believing that God is concerned about and responsive to human need.
Prayer expresses our personal relationship to God—a relationship that God intends and initiates
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member of the clergy prays in their name before a town board
meeting begins, the legislative setting and allegedly neutral tradition
surrounding the prayer may not easily transform the intrinsic nature
of prayer for the audience asked to stand during its recital.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy not only ignores this tradition, but
inexplicably he never actually addresses the obvious question of
whether standing and bowing one’s head while a prayer is expressed
in his or her name constitutes the exercise of religion for the
participant. Justice Kennedy’s primary focus is on how the audience
member’s conduct appears to others.190 He does not consider the
experience of standing and bowing one’s head from the audience
member’s perspective.
Justice Kennedy also ignores the role that physical movement
plays in religious exercise and prayer. To Justice Kennedy, standing
silently is a secular expression of respect. Certainly, there are
occasions when this is the only way to understand this physical
movement, such as when the audience is called on to rise when a
judge enters the courtroom. There is no common tradition for
standing during local board meetings, however, on which to build
this secular interpretation of standing during an opening prayer.
More importantly, again, there is a powerful tradition recognizing the
act of standing during the expression of a prayer as an essential part
of a religious exercise. As Justice Douglas noted, “The act of praying
often involves body posture and movement as well as utterances.”191
The meaningful role of posture and movements in prayer cannot
seriously be disputed. Often, worship involves acts as well as
words.192 Formal postures and gestures accompany spoken prayer

and that we accept through the intercession of the Holy Spirit. . . . In the end, prayer is about a
relationship in which we see God face to face as God loves us, with unflinching mercy, and gives
God’s self as a gift to each and every one of us. We give ourselves to God in return.” PATRICIA
D. BROWN, PATHS TO PRAYER 15 (2003).
190. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014) (contending that a
dissenter’s standing quietly while a state-sponsored prayer is expressed “will not . . . be
interpreted as an agreement with the words or ideas expressed”); supra notes 169–76 and
accompanying text.
191. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra
notes 169–76 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., ROY A. RAPPAPORT, ECOLOGY, MEANING, AND RELIGION 199 (1st ed. 1979)
(emphasizing that, “Liturgy’s acts may . . . speak more clearly than words”).
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and play an important communicative role in the act of worship.193
Different postures are associated with different faith traditions, but
the importance of physical movement to prayer is common to many
faiths.194 For example, the physical movements accompanying
Islamic prayer are structured and complex. Because daily “[p]rayer
for a Muslim involves uniting mind, soul, and body in worship . . . a
Muslim carrying out these prayers will perform a whole series of set
movements that go with the words of the prayer.”195 Standing,
bowing one’s head and kneeling are important aspects of Christian
worship for many denominations.196
Standing is a particularly meaningful posture for prayer in many
faith traditions. Jews do not always stand when they recite prayers,
but standing while praying has special significance. Indeed,
“standing is perhaps the most essential physical position of Jewish
prayer.”197 The most central prayer in the Jewish service, the Amidah
(the standing prayer), is recited while standing.198 Standing is
required for reciting the Amidah, while it is not required for other
prayers, because the Amidah “is a prayer addressed directly to
God.”199
Standing and kneeling are important communicative features of
Catholic worship as well. As one author explained, “The postures
193. Id. at 199–200; Frederick Mathewson Denny, Postures and Gestures, in LINDSAY JONES
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 7341 (2d ed. 2005); Heather M. Erb, Prayer Postures:
What They Mean & Why They Matter, 79 NEW OXFORD REV. 37 (Apr. 2012).
194. See, e.g., Denny, supra note 193, at 7341–42; Ladd & McIntosh, supra note 187, at 32;
Vasile Vlad, The Bodily Forms of the Prayer in Eastern Christian Spirituality, 5 SCI. J.
HUMANISTIC STUD. 166 (2013).
195. Salat: Daily Prayers, BBC (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions
/islam/practices/salat.shtml.
196. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Customs in the Episcopal Church, ALL
SAINTS’ EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CLINTON, S.C., http://allsaintsclinton.org/faqcustoms.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2014) (explaining that Episcopalians bow their heads at the name of Jesus in the
creeds and stand for the reading of the Gospel “out of respect for our Lord and the good news he
brought us . . . .”); TERESA A. BLYTHE, 50 WAYS TO PRAY 85–97 (2006).
197. Joshua Rabin, Physical Movement in Jewish Prayer: Speaking to God Through the Body,
MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/practices/Ritual/Prayer/Prayer_Music
_and_Liturgy/Physical_Movement.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
198. See YITZCHOK KIRZNER, THE ART OF JEWISH PRAYER 29–30 (1991).
199. See HAMMER, supra note 189, at 156. Uri Ehrlich explains the obligation for Jews to
stand while praying in somewhat similar terms. “What is of consequence is the worshiper’s
perception of prayer as an interpersonal relationship, similar to a student-master relationship;
hence the obligation to stand. If prayer is conceptualized as building a close experiential
encounter with the divine presence, in such a situation, as in the case of close proximity to a sage,
a standing posture is manifestly the appropriate one.” URI EHRLICH, THE NONVERBAL
LANGUAGE OF PRAYER: A NEW APPROACH TO JEWISH LITURGY 16 (Dena Ordan trans., 2004).
ET AL.,
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that we [Catholics] take during the liturgy are not empty rituals, but
they each have a meaning and a certain power of their own, greatly
influencing our experience. A common posture is a sign of the unity
of the Christian community gathered for the sacred liturgy. . . .”200
More specifically, “Standing is the primary posture that we take at
Mass since it best embodies the active stance of the participants. . . .
We stand to make a commitment.”201 Standing during other rituals
serve “as a sign of our active participation” in the worship service.202
Once again, it is this background understanding of the role that
physical movements such as standing and bowing one’s head play in
prayer that renders Justice Kennedy’s conclusions about the prayer
practices of the Town of Greece so myopic. Standing while prayers
are recited is the embodiment of religious exercise for some faiths. It
may be a distortion of the physical requirements of prayer for
others.203 The religious significance of physical movement in the act
of prayer cannot be cavalierly subsumed by repeated references to
the tradition of legislative prayer.
4. Coercion and the Timing of Prayers
Another argument related to the coercion of audience members
is the suggestion that the timing of the prayer might have some
relevance to its constitutionality. Justice Kennedy emphasized that
the prayer is offered “during the ceremonial portion of the town’s
meeting” when the board members “are not engaged in
policymaking.”204 It is possible to imply from this language that
prayers offered while the Board was engaged in its policymaking
functions would raise more serious concerns. Arguably, the
ceremonial activities occurring immediately after the prayer is
offered contribute to the understanding that the prayer serves a
200. Judith H. Bullock, Posture at Mass: Standing, ARCHDIOCESE OF LOUISVILLE,
http://www.archlou.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/PostureatMassStanding.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. State-sponsored prayer practices create conflicts for religious minorities not only with
regard to the words of the prayer, but also because of the physical movements accompanying the
verbal expression of the prayer. For example, a Jewish parent objecting to the Regents Prayer that
was ultimately struck down in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), argued “the children have
been taught to clasp their hands when they pray. We are Jewish and do not clasp our hands when
we pray.” See also BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: HOW ENGEL V.
VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 83 (Univ. Press of Kan. ed., 2007).
204. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014).
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purely ceremonial function, and the time during which the
presentation of awards and other ceremonial activities take place
serves as a temporal buffer between the offering of the prayer and the
public comment period during which residents may address and
petition the Board.
It is doubtful that Justice Kennedy assigned much weight to the
temporal buffer argument, however. As plaintiffs argued, over 40
percent of the time, there were no ceremonial activities at Town of
Greece Board meetings and public comment immediately followed
the offering of the prayer.205 If the Court actually believed that close
proximity of the prayer to public comment and policy-making
deliberations was significant, it is hard to understand why Justice
Kennedy did not even mention how often that proximity occurred.
Justice Alito appeared to recognize the possibility that prayer
practices like those in the Town of Greece may pressure and coerce
residents in the audience to participate in the prayer. He pointedly
noted that the prayers at issue in this case took place before the
legislative part of the board meeting. More importantly, Justice Alito
insisted that this case did not involve (and therefore one would
assume does not determine) the constitutionality of prayers offered
prior to adjudicatory proceedings.206 Justice Alito conceded that the
matters decided during the legislative portion of the meeting may
“involve very specific questions,” but he argued that this reality
“does not transform the nature of this part of the meeting.”207
This section of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is significant
for several reasons. Arguably, it limits the scope of the Court’s
holding to only upholding prayers before local government meetings
involving formally legislative proceedings.208 It certainly suggests
greater consideration and concern for the coercive consequences of
state-sponsored prayer than Justice Kennedy’s opinion. If implicit
coercion is never constitutionally significant, it is hard to know why
Justice Alito would distinguish prayers before adjudicatory
205. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 28.
206. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. There is considerable debate as to whether the concurring opinion of a Justice who joins
the majority opinion should bind or even influence lower court interpretations of the Court’s
holding and reasoning. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, A Potential Guide to the Meaning of
Hobby Lobby: Why Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion May be Key, Part I, JUSTIA VERDICT
(July 18, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/07/18/potential-guide-meaning-hobby-lobby.
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proceedings and suggest that they required additional constitutional
attention. The implication here is that the petitioner in an
adjudicatory hearing is sufficiently vulnerable to the implicitly
coercive impact of prayer requests to warrant judicial intervention,
but a person expressing views during public comment at a legislative
meeting does not merit the Court’s concern.
Justice Alito’s position is not entirely without merit. As a formal
matter, the process of decision-making, including the possibility of
meaningful appeals, varies between legislative and adjudicatory
proceedings.209 Further some legislative decisions, even at a small
town board meeting, will involve such broad policy matters that
affect so many people that a board member’s distaste for a few
residents that refuse to join the state-sponsored prayer is unlikely to
control his or her ultimate decision on the merits.
It is also true, however, that the identification of specific board
actions as either legislative or adjudicatory is often indeterminate.
The process of decision-making may be formally different, but the
categorization of matters into one class or another is arbitrary in
many cases.210
209. Unlike quasi-judicial proceedings, legislative decisions typically do not require formal
hearings or clear explanations justifying their enactment. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466−69 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that a local zoning commission’s
“decision to approve or disapprove a site plan is a legislative rather than adjudicative decision,”
the court stated that the commission is not required to conduct “adjudicative-type procedures, to
give reasons for their enactments, or to act ‘reasonably’ in the sense in which courts are required
to do”). They are also often subject to extremely deferential standards of review. See, e.g.,
Petersen v. Riverton City, 243 P. 3d 1261, 1265 (Utah 2010) (having determined that city’s land
use decision was legislative rather than quasi-judicial, court applies “the highly deferential
reasonably debatable standard” to review the city’s action rather than the more rigorous
substantial evidence standard of review).
210. As land use expert Daniel Mandelker explains, in land-use regulation cases “[s]ome
courts hold a legislature acts legislatively even when it exercises administrative functions and do
not require standards for the exercise of those functions. . . . [Other courts, to the contrary, hold]
the character of the function the legislative body exercises is determinative and requires standards
for the exercise of administrative functions.” DANIEL R. MANKELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.02
(5th ed. 2003). Rezoning cases are a classic example of the confusion courts encounter in trying
to determine whether a particular municipal decision is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature.
Jurisdictions are split as to how to characterize rezoning decisions with some states holding that
they are legislative in nature while others treat them as quasi-judicial actions. Id. at § 6.26.
Rezoning is hardly the only area of confusion, however. For example, after noting that “[l]egal
observers concede that the distinction between adjudicative and legislative decisions are not often
clear,” the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research of the State of California went on to
describe the convoluted case history of courts reversing themselves in attempting to determine
whether street abandonments were legislative or adjudicative acts. See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF
PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF CAL., BRIDGING THE GAP: USING FINDINGS IN LOCAL
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More importantly, as Justice Alito appears to recognize, many
formally legislative matters decided by a small town board will
involve issues that are of particular importance to only a very small
group of residents.211 In those situations, for the purpose of
protecting religious minorities and non-religious residents from
coercion, the individual addressing the board when it acts in its
legislative capacity is essentially in the same position as an
individual appearing before the board in an adjudicatory proceeding.
Indeed, the individual may be in an even worse situation because a
local board acting in its legislative capacity may often be influenced
by selfish parochial concerns, special interests, or bias and is rarely
required to justify its actions under any kind of meaningful
scrutiny.212 If the resident asking the board to reach a narrow
legislative decision does not stand and bow his head as requested by
the prayer-giver, he risks alienating the decision-makers he is trying
to influence and increases the likelihood of an adverse outcome. As a
formal matter a legislative proceeding is not an adjudicatory
proceeding. In small town meetings, however, the coercion inherent
in the prayer practices of the Town of Greece will be as problematic
in the former context as the latter.
5. Distinguishing Graduation Prayer from Legislative Prayer
Justice Kennedy’s final argument for rejecting plaintiffs’
coercion argument involves his attempt to distinguish Lee v.
LAND USE DECISIONS (2nd ed. 1989), available at http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/Bridging_Gap
/Gap_3.html#judicial_standards.
211. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he matters considered
by the board during this initial part of the meeting might involve very specific questions, such as
the installation of a traffic light or stop sign at a particular intersection . . . .”). Generic legislative
decisions will often have distinctively severe consequences for specific individuals in the context
of small town decision-making. For example, if the local police department has seven officers and
the town board is deciding whether or not to cut the department’s budget so that it will only be
able to retain six officers, this conventionally “legislative” budget decision will have special
meaning for the one or two officers who have most recently joined the department.
212. See, e.g., Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 466−69 (finding that it is not uncommon that the
decisions of local officials are often motivated by parochial views which contravene state law).
Congress recognized that the operation of the land use regulatory process by local governments
created an unacceptable risk of religious discrimination when it enacted the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc (2000). Because local
government actions regarding religious land uses were often highly individualized and subject to
the almost limitless discretion of local boards and officials, decision-making in these
circumstances was “particularly susceptible to religious discrimination.” Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 717, 740−42 (2008).
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Weisman,213 the case striking down state-sponsored prayer at public
high school graduations, from Town of Greece.214 Justice Kennedy
argues that Town of Greece is not governed by the analysis and
holding of Lee for two reasons. First, he seems to suggest that it is far
easier for an audience member to leave the room during the prayer
offered at a town board meeting unnoticed and without disturbing the
decorum of the event than it is for a graduating student to leave the
auditorium unnoticed and without creating a disturbance during the
invocation at her graduation ceremony.215
There is probably some difference here, but the important
question is whether it is a difference that matters. As I have argued
previously, leaving the room during the prayer at a small town board
meeting is more than noticeable enough to implicate coercion
concerns. The greater attention that might be directed at a departing
graduating student may strengthen her Establishment Clause
challenge, but it does not undermine the arguments of plaintiffs in
Town of Greece. Moreover, Lee is not the only relevant precedent
here. The Court also struck down state-sponsored prayers at public
high school football games in Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe.216 Yet it would be hard to argue that a student leaving the
stands during the prayer offered at a high school football game
would be more noticeable to school authorities and potentially
disruptive of the event than an audience member leaving the board
meeting room during a state-sponsored prayer.
Justice Kennedy’s second argument is even more problematic.
The plaintiff in Lee was a minor, and as such was particularly
susceptible to peer pressure and religious indoctrination.217 The
protection against coercion that the Establishment Clause provides to
minors, Justice Kennedy explains, cannot be extended to “mature
adults [such as the plaintiffs in Town of Greece] who ‘presumably’
are ‘not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer
pressure.’”218

213. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
214. Id.
215. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
216. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
217. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 578.
218. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792
(1983)).
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There are serious difficulties with this analysis. If we focus on
the context and setting of the two cases and not on the minority or
majority status of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs in Town of Greece would
seem to have a far stronger coercion claim than the plaintiff in Lee.
Plaintiffs in both cases could argue they were coerced by peer
pressure. But plaintiffs in Town of Greece have a separate and more
powerful argument. They are worried that the Town Board will
decide issues that are important to their lives and property adversely
to their interests if they do not comply with requests to participate in
state-sponsored prayers. These are material, not psychological
consequences, inflicted by the government itself, not by private
peers.
The plaintiff in Lee had no such argument. She has just
graduated from her school. During the school year, because school
authorities, principal, and teachers have considerable discretionary
authority over students’ grades and future opportunities, students
may be justifiably wary of offending them by not participating in a
school sponsored prayer.219 Indeed, this is one of the reasons courts
are particularly concerned about the promotion of religion in the
public schools.220 In this sense, residents attending small town board
meetings share common concerns with public school students who
are requested to participate in state-sponsored prayers. Both groups
must be wary of alienating authorities who have so much
discretionary power over matters that are important to them. The
school authorities have no such power over students after they
graduate, however. Students who refuse to pray at graduation need

219. Fear of reprisals from teachers and school authorities has always been a concern of
dissenting students and their parents. One of the children involved in the Engel v. Vitale lawsuit,
for example, describes experiencing “antagonism from the teachers, no question about that.”
JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 72 (2004); see also DIERENFIELD, supra note 203, at 108 (discussing specific examples
of students being singled out for their personal or familial religious beliefs). Ellory Schempp, one
of the Schempp children whose opposition to being forced to recite the Lord’s Prayer and listen to
Bible verses read over the public address system was vindicated in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), was subjected to furious scolding from his school
principal when he refused to participate in mandatory devotions. DIERENFIELD, supra note 203, at
165. Not content with browbeating the high school student, the principal wrote to the colleges
that Ellory had applied to for admission and urged them to reject his application. Learning that
Tufts University had accepted the Schempp boy into its entering class, the principal tried to
convince the university to rescind his admission. Id. at 168.
220. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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no longer fear how their teachers or principal will evaluate their
work or reach other decisions of personal importance to them.
The other problem with Justice Kennedy’s argument has its
roots in earlier Establishment Clause cases. The Court has suggested
that we protect minor students in public schools from state-sponsored
religious activities because they are young and impressionable and
are “highly susceptible to religious indoctrination.”221 Adults, on the
other hand, are presumed to have greater knowledge, experience, and
will power and accordingly, will be able to resist such indoctrination.
In essence, children in school will believe what their teachers and the
principal tell them about religion as a matter of course. Adults will
not be so easily persuaded.
While there is some truth to this analysis, part of it is grounded
on an erroneous understanding of what is problematic about religious
coercion for constitutional purposes. The premise on which this
conclusion is grounded appears to be that we are primarily concerned
about state coercion of religious belief and practice because it will
work. The coerced individual will sacrifice his beliefs and
conscience to avoid state sanctions. If that result is less likely
because adults will have the moral fortitude to withstand more
intense forms of state coercion than children, then there is less reason
to be concerned about state attempts to influence the religious belief
and behavior of adults.
That premise must be wrong, however. Religious coercion is
constitutionally impermissible whether it is likely to be effective or
not. It violates our commitment to human dignity and personal
autonomy to allow the state to pressure religious individuals to
violate their beliefs and conscience. The ability or willingness of
certain groups to maintain their religious integrity in the face of
direct or indirect compulsion should not undermine our conclusion
that such coercion is constitutionally impermissible. What is
unacceptable is that individuals are forced to choose between fidelity
to their faith and conscience or the risk of state sanction. How
particular individuals respond to that choice is irrelevant to the
221. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); see also, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (“Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to
advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.”).
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constitutionality of the state’s actions. The fact that audience
members before a town board may decide to risk adverse decisions
from the board rather than violate their conscience by standing for a
prayer in their name that misrepresents their beliefs does not justify
confronting them with these unacceptable alternatives.
6. Protecting the Religious Autonomy of the Government
Selected Prayer-Giver
While Justice Kennedy’s opinion demonstrates almost total
disregard for the religious liberty and conscience of residents who
attend town board meetings, he offers surprisingly strong protection
to the conscience of potential prayer-givers who might be invited to
offer prayers before the same meetings. The juxtaposition of the
Court’s conclusions here is striking. On the one hand, the Court does
not require the Town to do much of anything to mitigate the coercion
of residents who are directed to stand and bow their heads while
sectarian prayers are offered in their name. On the other hand, the
Court contends that towns may not take any steps to influence the
prayer-givers decisions as to the sectarian content they will express
in their prayers. Justice Kennedy insists, “Once it invites prayer into
the public sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address
his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by
what an administrator or judge considers to be nonsectarian.”222
As might be expected in an opinion that gets so many other
things wrong, Justice Kennedy’s analysis here comes pretty close to
being just plain backwards. Because government involvement with
religion so commonly threatens religious liberty and religious
equality, often the safest way to guarantee constitutional values is for
the state to keep its distance from religion. That, of course, could be
easily accomplished in the context of this case by a town electing not
to begin its board meetings with a prayer at all. The Constitution may
not require the town to make this decision, however. There may be
constitutionally permissible ways to begin board meetings with a
prayer.223 The overriding principle, however, must be this. Once the
222. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822−23.
223. Complex questions may arise in some cases as to whether free speech doctrine or
religion clause doctrine should govern state action involving religious expressive activities. See
generally Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J. L. & POL. 119 (2002). It is possible, for example, that the
government can open up a limited public forum in which both private secular and religious
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state decides to involve itself with religion and “invites prayer into
the public sphere,” it is constitutionally required to take appropriate
steps to protect religious liberty and equality when it does so.224 The
idea that when the government involves itself with religion, the
Constitution somehow prevents it from mitigating the resulting
burdens on religious liberty and equality that result from that
involvement simply turns church-state doctrine on its head.
Certainly, there is nothing in the Marsh opinion that supports the
idea that the legislature lacks the authority to assert any control over
the prayers offered to begin its sessions. Indeed, the reasoning and
holding of Marsh is to the contrary. The Court noted in Marsh that
the chaplain offering prayers before the Nebraska legislature changed
the content of his prayers and made them more ecumenical when he
was requested to do so by a Jewish legislator.225 There is no
suggestion whatsoever that the Constitution prevented the legislature
as a whole, or a committee supervising the chaplain’s duties, from
expressing a similar request.
Indeed, it seems odd at best to suggest that a state legislature
cannot decline to renew the contract of a chaplain they had hired to
offer prayers before legislative sessions because they believed the
prayers offered were unsuitable for a religious diverse institutional
body and failed to achieve the goals the legislature sought to
accomplish with its prayer program. Yet, the logic of Justice
Kennedy’s analysis in Town of Greece would suggest that such
supervisory oversight of a chaplaincy is unconstitutional. Similarly,
if Justice Kennedy is correct that the prayers offered at the Town of
Greece Board meetings were directed at the Board members, not the
audience, it is hard to understand why the Constitution prohibits the
Board from telling prayer-givers that they hope to hear prayers that
speech is expressed. See, e.g., Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995). No such argument is available in Town of Greece, however. The Town invites specific
individuals to offer prayers as guest chaplains during a government meeting. It chooses the
speakers based on their religious affiliation and status. Such arrangements make it clear that the
prayer practice here constitutes state-sponsored speech, not private speech in a limited public
forum. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Moreover, even under
free speech forum analysis, the Town’s practices would be unconstitutional. Religion is a
viewpoint of speech. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). In
favoring religious speech, the Town engages in viewpoint discrimination which is
unconstitutional under long accepted free speech doctrine. See id.
224. Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra note 126, at 1534–35.
225. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791–95.
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will emphasize the common religious and ethical beliefs that the
Board members share rather than prayers that emphasize
denominational differences that may fail to achieve the Board’s
purpose in requesting that a prayer be offered in the first place.
7. The Link Between Non-Sectarian Prayer and Coercion
An issue which received little attention from the majority,
concurring, or dissenting opinions in Town of Greece is whether
plaintiffs’ argument about the sectarian nature of the prayers and the
Town’s perceived alignment with Christianity relates in any
substantive way to plaintiffs’ argument about coercion. The concern
about the sectarian nature of the prayer and the Town’s affiliation
with Christianity seems to be primarily grounded in religious
equality. The claim that residents are coerced into standing and
participating in the prayer, on the other hand, is more easily
characterized as a religious liberty issue.
It is not obvious, for example, how changing the content of the
prayer or inviting guest chaplains from a broader range of faiths
mitigates the coercive nature of a town’s prayer practice. While some
residents may feel more comfortable if a more generic prayer is
offered, it may be argued that a resident who believes that a generic
prayer does not reflect his or her beliefs will still feel pressured when
he or she is asked to stand and join the prayer. Similarly, if a Muslim
resident of a town attends a board meeting when a sectarian
Protestant prayer is offered, how does the fact that on one occasion
every two or three years a Muslim cleric will offer the prayer reduce
the coercion the Muslim resident experiences to participate in the
prayer being offered on the day he attends the board meeting?
While these arguments have considerable force, there is a way
that a shift from sectarian to generic prayers and to a broader range
of potential prayer-givers may mitigate the coercion intrinsic to statesponsored prayers at small town board meetings—although it will
not eliminate such coercion entirely. When all the prayer-givers and
all the prayers are aligned with a particular religion, it will be clear to
everyone attending a board meeting that the prayer being offered
reflects the religious beliefs of all, or at least a substantial majority,
of the members of the board. Accordingly, if a resident leaves the
room when the prayer is offered, they have every reason to fear that
their conduct will be construed to be disrespectful to the board
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members’ own religion. That perception is particularly likely to
antagonize the very decision-makers that the dissenting resident will
be trying to influence a short time later.
Generic prayers, however, are less likely to reflect the faith of
particular board members. Just as a generic prayer may be less
objectionable to a broader constituency, the generic prayer is also
less likely to reflect the denominationally-distinct beliefs or religious
identity of any member of the board. Thus, a dissenting audience
member who refuses to participate in the offered prayer is less likely
to fear that by doing so he will be deemed to be acting
disrespectfully to the religion adhered to by the board members
themselves.
A similar, but somewhat less persuasive, argument applies to
prayers offered by a more diverse group of guest chaplains. Here, the
contention would be that the increased diversity of prayer-givers
distances the individual board members from the substantive content
of the prayer practice at board meetings. The more that the prayers
offered are understood to reflect the beliefs of different faith
traditions, the less likely it is that board members will identify with
the prayer practice the same way that they would if all the prayers
reflected the board members’ own beliefs. Increasing the distance
between the prayer practice in general and the religious identity of
the board members may ameliorate worries that a failure to
participate in the prayer would be construed to be a challenge to the
board members’ faith.226
V. REMEDIAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY EQUALITY AND LIBERTY
BASED CHALLENGES TO STATE-SPONSORED
PRAYER AT TOWN BOARD MEETINGS
One of the underlying themes addressed during the oral
argument in Town of Greece227 and in Justice Alito’s challenge to
226. While these arguments suggest that a shift from sectarian to more generic prayers may
mitigate coercion to some extent, I consider such a shift to be of secondary utility in reducing
religious coercion in the context of a small town board meeting. More effective ways to reduce
coercion would be to use “I” prayers instead of “We” prayers, to have the guest chaplain face the
board, rather, than the audience if the prayer is to be primarily directed at the board, to offer a
disclaimer and explanation to make it clear that the board is not aligning itself with particular
religious beliefs or practices, and to avoid having the chaplain invite audience member to stand,
bow, their heads, and join in the prayer.
227. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 31:17–35:17, 38:23–40:17, 42:2–
47:5.
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Justice Kagan’s dissent228 involves the remedy plaintiffs are seeking
for the constitutional violations they allege. Are plaintiffs insisting
that any and all prayers before town board meetings are
unconstitutional? If not, what are the feasible, constitutionally
permissible constraints they would impose on town board
prayer-practices to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the burdens on
religious liberty and equality on which they base their claims?
Justice Kennedy’s opinion focuses on plaintiffs’ argument that
the Establishment Clause prohibits state-sponsored sectarian prayers
at town board meetings.229 Justice Kennedy defends such prayers as
a substantive matter because he contends they are consistent with our
historical traditions230 and the government has no business telling
clergy what is acceptable content of the prayers they may express—
even when the prayers are offered at the government’s request at
government functions.231 But the Court also expressed concerns
about the feasibility of a requirement prohibiting sectarian prayer.
How is a town board or a reviewing judge to determine whether the
terminology of a prayer is sufficiently generic to satisfy
constitutional standards? Whatever words are expressed in a prayer,
it is likely that some individuals or groups may claim, with some
justification, that the prayer is not sufficiently inclusive to reflect
their beliefs.232
Plaintiffs had a forceful response to this argument. While it is
easy to conjure up hypothetical problems with the requirement of
inclusive, non-sectarian prayers, in fact such standards are commonly
applied, without any obvious difficulty, throughout the United
States.233 The House of Representatives, many state legislatures, and
all the cities, counties, and state legislatures within the Fourth Circuit
operate under such a system.234 In the real world, the problems the
Court envisions simply have not occurred.

228. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
229. See id. at 1820–24 (majority opinion).
230. See id. at 1824 (“The prayers delivered in the town of Greece do not fall outside the
tradition this Court has recognized.”).
231. See id. at 1822–23.
232. See id. at 1822.
233. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 50–52; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 152, at 34:10–35:1, 46:19–46:25, 50:16–50:23.
234. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1845–46 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondents, supra note 3, at 50–52.
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Notwithstanding this rejoinder, the Court’s concerns here cannot
be totally discounted. Indeed, the broader and more inclusive prayers
may be, in response to a town’s request, the more painful the
experience may be for those few individuals or groups who continue
to feel excluded from its coverage.235 A court committed to
protecting religious liberty and equality might still balk at a
constitutional requirement prohibiting the offering of sectarian
prayers at town board meetings.
Short of prohibiting non-sectarian prayers, are there other
remedial constraints the Court could have imposed on the offering of
state-sponsored prayers to protect the religious liberty and equality
rights of residents attending town board meetings? The answer to this
question is obviously an affirmative one, notwithstanding the fact
that the Court ignored many of these possibilities and summarily
rejected the others. If one examines the opinions of the dissenting
Justices, Judge Calabresi’s opinion for the Second Circuit, and the
plaintiffs’ arguments in their brief and oral argument, it is clear that
numerous aspects of the Town’s prayer practice were identified as
problematic and that changes to those practices would make the
prayer practice more consistent with constitutional values.
As discussed previously, the Town’s imprecise and limited
process by which guest chaplains were invited to offer prayers at
meetings was criticized as discriminatory in effect and contributing
to the religious homogeneity of both the clergy invited to Board
meetings and the content of the prayers they offered.236 The solution
to these defects could be easily accomplished. A town deciding to
sponsor prayers at board meetings should be required to adopt a
selection policy that is written down and supervised. Neither ad hoc
decisions by unsupervised petty functionaries nor unwritten
invitation policies never communicated to the public are acceptable.
Residents who are members of minority faiths with too few
adherents to create a local congregation and who attend houses of
worship outside of the town’s borders must be treated as if they exist
and deserve the same respect as residents who are members of
in-town congregations. The same principle applies to residents who
235. See Alan Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue: A Discussion of Justice
Stevens’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 605, 648–
51 (2012).
236. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
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are spiritual but are not affiliated with any organized religion and
residents who are not religious.237 The policy must require serious
efforts to assure that all congregations and all residents located in the
community are recognized.
Justice Kennedy never explains why a broader, more rulegoverned, and more transparent selection process for inviting prayergivers is not required. Justice Alito’s suggestion that a policy more
protective of religious equality is beyond the ability of small towns238
is hard to take seriously. As Justice Breyer explained in his dissent,
in addition to engaging in a greater effort to communicate with
houses of worship in neighboring communities, and announcing the
open opportunity to serve as guest chaplain at the beginning of Board
meetings, the Town easily could “have posted its policy of
permitting anyone to give an invocation on its website . . . which
provides dates and times of upcoming town board meetings.”239
Instead, the Town did nothing to achieve even the semblance of
religious equality in its selection procedures.240 For the majority of
the Court, nothing was good enough.
Equality concerns could also be mitigated if a town provided
guidance to the prayer-givers as to the purpose of the prayer and the
kinds of prayers that are inconsistent with that purpose and would
raise constitutional concerns. While the Court sees no constitutional
problem with highly sectarian prayers, it explains that legislative
prayers that fall within our constitutional tradition are designed to
elevate the proceedings and invite lawmakers to “reflect upon shared
ideals and common ends.”241 Prayers that “denigrate nonbelievers or
religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion,”
serve other purposes and are constitutionally suspect.242 Yet the
Court does not require town boards to inform the clergy they invite
of these constitutional parameters. Instead, it holds that plaintiffs can
only challenge a course or practice of inappropriate prayers. This is

237. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 31 (explaining that with regard to the Town’s failure to invite
individuals who are not affiliated with religious institutions to offer prayers, “[t]he town is not a
community of religious institutions, but of individual residents, and, at the least, it must serve
those residents without favor or disfavor to any creed or belief”).
238. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 1823 (majority opinion).
242. Id.
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not only an extraordinarily difficult burden to meet, but in the
ordinary course of events it will do nothing to protect minorities
from disparaging or proselytizing prayers.
A brief statement by a board to the audience before a prayer is
expressed could also mitigate equality concerns. The board could
explain the solemnizing function of the state-sponsored prayers,
clarify that the board understands and respects the diversity of beliefs
in the community, and assure everyone that the choice of guest
chaplain and the content of the offered prayer does not reflect the
board’s endorsement of a particular faith or belief.243 The Court
required no such explanation or disclaimer.
The guest chaplain should also be advised that the prayer should
be offered in his name, not in the name of the audience in
attendance.244 Government has no vested authority to speak to G-d in
the name of its citizens.245 Moreover, concerns about the sectarian
terminology of prayers are sharply reduced when it is clear the
prayer reflects the beliefs of the chaplain offering the prayer and not
the beliefs of people of other faiths or no faith in the audience. This
admonition to prospective guest chaplains would not require the
parsing of prayers or an evaluation of the inclusivity or exclusivity of
specific language. In most cases, it would simply require the chaplain
to offer an “I” prayer as opposed to a “we” prayer.246
Further, the board could explain before the prayer is offered that
it understands that in a religious diverse community, there is no one
size fits all prayer and the audience cannot and should not be
expected to stand and participate in prayers of other faiths. It should
be emphasized that no such conduct is expected or required of the
audience.247 If the prayer is actually to be directed at the board and
not the audience, as Justice Kennedy insists it is,248 the board should
make that clear to the audience as well. The guest chaplain should
face the board members if they are the intended beneficiaries of the
prayer.
243. See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 1850–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Galloway, 681
F.3d at 32–33.
244. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1848 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting); Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32.
245. Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra note 126, at 1529.
246. Id. at 1536.
247. Id.
248. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825–26.
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All of these steps are easily accomplished. None seriously
interfere with the guest chaplain’s ability to pray in a way that is
meaningful to him or her. Taken together, they substantially reduce
the religious liberty and equality costs of offering a state-sponsored
prayer at the beginning of a town board meeting. The Court did not
require town boards to take any of these steps.
VI. THE DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF TOWN OF GREECE
A. The Parameters of Prayer Practices at Town Board Meetings
1. Who Must be Invited to Offer Prayers?
What Town of Greece means for future Establishment Clause
cases is not easy to decipher. The first and somewhat less difficult
question is what this decision says about the constitutionality of
prayers offered at town board or city council meetings. These prayers
are now presumptively constitutional to the extent that they model
the practices upheld in Town of Greece. Serious questions remain,
however, as to exactly what that model entails and when a prayer
practice unconstitutionally departs from it.
An initial question is what constitutes a constitutionally
acceptable invitation policy to individuals asked to offer prayers?
Although it runs counter to every constitutional intuition in any other
area of constitutional law in which salient values and concerns about
bias and discrimination are recognized, it would seem that a town
can escape serious Establishment Clause scrutiny by assigning the
job of inviting individuals to offer prayers to some petty functionary
and provide him little guidance as to how to proceed in arranging
prayers to be offered each month. A clerk could invite all organized
congregations reflecting majoritarian beliefs, “inadvertently” ignore
the one or two religious minority congregations in the community for
at least ten years, and pay no attention whatsoever to nonaffiliated
residents, nonreligious individuals, or adherents of minority faiths
who worship in congregations outside of town. That is the model the
Court upheld in Town of Greece. It is in my view an entirely
unjustified and unsympathetic model, but it is what the Court has
upheld. What happens, however, if a town deviates from this model?
If a town adopts a formal policy for inviting individuals to offer
prayers, it might be more constrained in its options. While the Court
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clearly accepts discrimination in favor of organized religious
congregations and against less established faiths in compiling the
invitation list, discrimination among organized congregations is more
problematic. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion suggests that an
intentional decision to exclude the few minority religious
congregations within the town’s borders would be unconstitutional.
Indeed, Justice Alito states that a deliberate decision to exclude
synagogues in neighboring communities—at which Jewish town
residents worshipped—from the list of potential guest chaplains
would create a very different case than the one before him.249
Justice Kennedy’s opinion would not go that far. He explicitly
rejects the idea that the town is required “to search beyond its
borders” for prayer-givers of minority faiths.250 Moreover, it is not
even clear that Justice Kennedy would strike down a policy that
deliberately excluded local minority congregations from the list of
potential guest chaplains as long as adherents of these minority faiths
would be considered as potential prayer-givers on a
non-discriminatory basis if they asked for the opportunity to offer a
prayer. Much of the language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion implies
that a willingness to allow anyone who is not on the list of eligible
prayer-givers to offer a prayer if they request the chance to do so
cures any lack of inclusivity in the list of invited guest chaplains.251
Two additional problems remain unresolved. First, what if the
town did not invite clergy from all or almost all of its congregations
to serve as prayer-givers, but instead only invited a minister from one
house of worship or clergy from two or three denominations? Would
that be unconstitutional? As noted earlier, the Marsh decision, on
which Town of Greece purports to be based, involved a legislative
chaplain from one Protestant denomination who had served in that
post for eighteen years. Yet the Court in Marsh saw no constitutional
vulnerability in that policy. Thus, the Court’s call for a policy of
non-discrimination in Town of Greece seems inconsistent with
Marsh. This leaves open the question of whether Town of Greece
modifies the holding in Marsh to require legislative prayer-givers to
249. Id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 1824 (majority opinion).
251. See, e.g., id. at 1816 (“The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a
would-be prayer giver. Its leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any persuasion,
including an atheist, could give the invocation.”).
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be selected on an inclusive, non-discriminatory basis or whether
there are now two constitutional models for legislative prayer—
either of which would satisfy constitutional requirements. A town
could invite a range of prayer-givers from various denominations, in
which case it must abide by a policy of non-discrimination among
faiths, or it can select one or a small number of “chaplains” to offer
prayers, in which case it can favor one or a select few faiths.252
Second, what must a town do to respond to requests by
uninvited clergy and lay persons to be included on the list of
potential guest chaplains? The town can discriminate initially in
favor of clergy from organized congregations in creating the list of
prayer-givers. Can it also assign some priority to organized
congregations or clergy from such institutions in deciding which
guest chaplains to invite first? Are persons who request the
opportunity to be a prayer-giver placed at the bottom of the list
behind the names of clergy from local congregations the town has
already identified as possible guest chaplains? The Town of Greece
opinion gives little guidance on these issues.
These concerns may become increasingly important depending
on the possible political consequences of Town of Greece. The
Court’s approval of legislative prayer may encourage some
communities where prayers have not been offered in the past, to
institute this practice. Also, dissenters from these prayer practices
who object to the alignment of their government with religion or a
particular faith may now believe that litigation to challenge the
prayers is futile. Accordingly, the only way to provide some
recognition of the diversity of belief within a community will be for
adherents of minority faiths and non-religious individuals to request
the opportunity to offer invocations at board meetings. It remains to
be seen how those individuals will be treated in light of the reasoning
and holding of Town of Greece.

252. Lupu and Tuttle suggest that other alternatives may be available. It is not clear for
example that it would be unconstitutional if the board members chose to “rotate the prayer
opportunity among themselves.” IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT,
RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 265 (2014).
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2. What Constitutional Constraints Apply to the Structure
and Content of Legislative Prayer?
Notwithstanding the Court’s general affirmation of the
constitutionality of legislative prayers before town board meetings,
the scope and nature of legislative prayer is not unlimited. It is at
least arguable that the Court may recognize certain time constraints
as to when prayers may be offered. As noted, Justice Kennedy did
point out that the prayers in the Town of Greece Board meetings
were offered during the “ceremonial portion of the town’s meeting”
at a time when board members were “not engaged in policy
making.”253 Justice Alito is even more specific in explaining the case
does not “involve the constitutionality of a prayer prior to what may
be characterized as an adjudicatory proceeding,” and only evaluates
prayer before the legislative part of the Board meeting.254 Thus, there
remains an open question as to whether government-sponsored
prayers can be offered immediately before a town board engages in
non-legislative, administrative or adjudicatory actions.
Justice Kennedy also notes that an invocation involving a
“lengthy disquisition on religious dogma” may exceed the
parameters of the tradition of legislative prayer approved of in
Marsh.255Apparently at some point the legislative prayer may go on
for such a long time that it constitutes a state-sponsored religious
service. As such, it would arguably unconstitutionally promote
religion and burden dissenters. How long is too long, of course, is
anybody’s guess. But there is some implicit sense in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion that what the Court is upholding must be
cognizable as a ceremonial prayer and not some other kind of
religious exercise or form of worship.
There may be some manner constraints on prayers as well. The
Court affirms that prayer-givers may ask the audience to stand and
bow their heads and join in the offered prayer. It is unclear whether
there are any limits to such requests. May a prayer-giver ask the
audience to kneel while the prayer is offered? Alternatively, may he

253. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1815, 1827.
254. Id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 1826–27.

432

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:371

or she ask the audience to raise their hands if they believe in the
efficacy of prayer or the divinity of Jesus Christ?256
The Court says much more about the content of permissible
prayers. After Town of Greece, it is abundantly clear that legislative
prayer may be sectarian. It may express its message to G-d in
explicitly denominational terms that reflect the beliefs and doctrine
of particular faiths. Indeed, according to the Court, it would violate
the Constitution for the town board to attempt to require the
prayer-giver to express his message in more ecumenical terms.257
Some constraints on the content of prayers are recognized,
however. The limits fall into two categories. On the one hand, there
is a constraint on the extent to which the prayer can disparage others.
Justice Kennedy says repeatedly that to be constitutionally
acceptable and serve their ceremonial function, legislative prayers
may not “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities” or “threaten
[them with] damnation.”258 Such prayers may not denigrate others or
betray an impermissible government purpose.259 They cannot
“‘disparage any other, faith or belief’”260 or “chastise dissenters.”261
On the other hand, there is also a limit on the extent to which
legislative prayers may promote religion or a particular faith.
Legislative prayers may not “preach conversion.”262 They may not
“proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief.”263
The Court also emphasizes, however, that a single instance of
proselytizing or disparaging messages is of no constitutional
significance. There must be a “course and practice [of transgressions]
over time.”264 Only evidence of “the pattern of prayers over time”
can support an Establishment Clause claim.265 The focus must be on

256. During oral argument, plaintiffs’ attorney, Professor Laycock, argued that just such a
prayer would be permissible if the Court held that the government could not control the content
and nature of prayers offered by invited clergy. See Brownstein, State-Sponsored Prayers, supra
note 126, at 1535–36. Justice Scalia responded repeatedly to this example by insisting: “That’s
not a prayer.” Id.
257. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822–23.
258. Id. at 1823.
259. See id. at 1824.
260. Id. at 1823 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)).
261. Id. at 1826.
262. Id. at 1823.
263. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
264. Id.
265. See id. at 1826–27.
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“the prayer opportunity as a whole, rather than [on] the contents of a
single prayer.”266
A meaningful prohibition against proselytizing or the
disparaging of other faiths or nonreligious individuals would raise
serious questions about how these impermissible prayers could be
identified. There is little reason to think that the Court is interested in
a nuanced analysis of these concerns, however. Many of the prayers
at issue in Town of Greece proclaimed the truth and extolled the
virtue of Christian beliefs. There is no indication that the plurality
and concurring justices viewed any of these prayers as proselytizing.
It appears that to constitute proselytizing a prayer must explicitly
urge conversion in no uncertain terms. The line may be tighter
regarding disparaging messages. But here, of course, the Court
rejects the central thrust of plaintiffs’ arguments in this case. What is
disparaging about the prayer practice of the Town of Greece is that
for a decade the selection of prayer-givers and the prayers they
expressed treated adherents of minority faiths, the spiritually
unaffiliated, and non-religious residents as if they did not exist or did
not deserve recognition for their beliefs. That message of
disparagement is constitutionally acceptable to the current Court.267
While there may not be much to these substantive constraints,
one may certainly imagine a community far more sensitive to
religious liberty and equality concerns than the Town of Greece (or
the Court) that tries to take them seriously. What exactly may such a
community do to enforce these standards? One would presume that it
could inform individuals selected to offer prayers that they cannot
proselytize or disparage nonbelievers. A harder question is whether
they can criticize a prayer-giver who violates these standards and
refuse to invite him back unless he conforms his prayer to
constitutional requirements. There may be legal vulnerability here if
the town believes the “chaplain” has engaged in proselytizing or
disparaging prayer and a reviewing court disagrees with that
assessment. Town of Greece suggests that once the town invites an
individual to offer a prayer before a town board meeting, the
Constitution protects the right of that individual to offer any prayer
he chooses without regard to its sectarian nature. The line between

266. Id. at 1824.
267. See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
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the impermissible proselytizing of one faith (or the disparagement of
another) and permissible sectarian prayer may be extremely thin and
depend on the eye of the beholder.
Alternatively, some communities may see little harm in
proselytizing prayers or prayers that disparage nonbelievers. If an
individual invited to offer a prayer engages in proselytizing or
denigrates religious minorities, does the town have any obligation to
respond to his remarks or to deny him an opportunity to offers
prayers at the town board meeting in the future? As long as most
“guest chaplains” offer prayers consistent with the constitutional
standards governing legislative prayer, it is uncertain whether a
town’s tolerance of a “chaplain” who repeatedly violates these
standards constitutes the kind of pattern that violates the
Establishment Clause.
B. The Application of Town of Greece to the Adjudication
of Establishment Clause Claims Against State-Sponsored
Religious Messages in Other Settings
Supporters of a meaningful constitutional commitment to
religious liberty and religious equality can only hope that the
reasoning and holding of Town of Greece is limited to legislative
prayer. There is some language that supports a narrow reading of the
case in Justice Kennedy’s opinion,268 but other language suggests
that the opinion is not limited to the context of legislative prayer.269
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is more explicit. As noted, he
argues that the Town of Greece decision extends only to legislative
meetings and not adjudicatory proceedings. More emphatically, at
the conclusion of his concurrence he challenges the hypotheticals
Justice Kagan presented in her dissent and their implication that
268. Part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the historical tradition supporting
legislative prayer and that this tradition “has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political
change.” Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819. This at least suggests that his opinion is limited to
government-sponsored prayers or religious displays with a strong pedigree that has continued to
the current time.
269. Other language in Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems far more expansive. His contention
that government is disabled from controlling the content of state-sponsored prayer “once it invites
prayer into the public sphere” could apply outside of the context of legislative prayer. See, e.g.,
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822–23. More problematically, Justice Kennedy’s dismissal of
plaintiffs’ coercion claims because plaintiffs did not allege specific threats of sanctions and
because no one would notice or care if plaintiffs walked out when a state-sponsored prayer was
offered seems based on an understanding of social reality that extends beyond the legislature’s
chambers. See id. at 1826–27.
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citizens could be asked by government officials to join in prayer in a
variety of settings. “Nothing could be further from the truth,” Justice
Alito insists.270 “All that the Court does today is to allow a town to
follow a practice that we have previously held is permissible for
Congress and state legislatures.”271
If the reasoning and holding of Town of Greece is determined to
be broadly applicable, the liberty and equality interests of religious
minorities and non-religious people would be substantially
diminished. Consider first the implications of Town of Greece for
religious equality. First, previous doctrinal constraints on religious
displays and state-sponsored prayers no longer apply. The
endorsement test, championed by Justice O’Connor, has no place in
the Court’s opinion.272 Nor is the Court constrained by Justice
Scalia’s repeated suggestion that government cannot sponsor
messages on which monotheistic believers in a personal G-d would
disagree.273
Second, with regard to government invitations to private
individuals and organizations to express state-sponsored religious
messages on public property, government would be permitted to
discriminate in favor of organized congregations and entirely ignore
religious minorities with too few adherents in the community to
support a congregation. It could ignore the beliefs and messages of
nonaffiliated residents and nonreligious individuals as well. The only
limit to this discrimination is that the government must include (to
some undetermined extent) the messages of religious minorities and
nonreligious residents who ask to participate in its expressive
program. Under this analysis, for example, it would seem that the
government could invite all the religious congregations in the
community to display religious murals on the walls of government
buildings and place religious icons in the lobby of every government
office building. As long as the government would accept requests
from minorities and nonreligious residents to participate in the
program, again to some indeterminate extent, the Establishment
Clause would not be violated.

270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1834 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 252, at 263.
See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
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The cumulative effect of the religious messages of majority
faiths pervading public property in the community would be
irrelevant to the constitutional analysis, just as the cumulative effect
of a decade of sectarian Christian prayers before town board
meetings was irrelevant to the Court’s analysis in Town of Greece.
Taken to its logical conclusion, presumably the town board in a
predominately Christian community could invite all the local
churches to erect a large billboard at the entrance to the town,
proclaiming that this is a Christian community, quoting a sectarian
prayer, and listing the Christian congregations in the town—as long
as there was a note at the bottom of the sign indicating that some
non-Christians and non-religious people live here too.
Third, state-sponsored prayers and religious displays could
explicitly extoll the beliefs and commitments of majoritarian faiths.
The prayers and displays could not involve a pattern and practice of
preaching conversion or disparaging minorities and nonbelievers.
However, individual instances of state-sponsored proselytizing or the
denigration of minorities would have no constitutional significance.
A commitment to religious equality requires government to treat
people of all faiths and those who are not religious as if they are of
equal worth and deserving of equal respect. Under Town of Greece,
government may treat religious minorities as if they barely exist and
certainly do not count as respected members of the community. If
Town of Greece is interpreted expansively, religious equality would
mean as little in the public life of largely, religiously homogeneous
communities throughout the United States as it does in the town
board chambers of the Town of Greece.
The implications of an expansive reading of Town of Greece for
religious liberty are equally if not more disastrous. As noted
previously, the line between Justices Thomas’s and Scalia’s
contention that the only coercion that counts for Establishment
Clause purposes is that which is imposed “by force of law and threat
of penalty” and Justice Kennedy’s position is perilously thin.274
Justice Kennedy’s insistence that to demonstrate coercion plaintiffs
must prove that decision-makers took plaintiffs refusal to participate
in prayers into account in denying them benefits (or otherwise ruling
against their interests) or indicated in some way that they intended to
274. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.
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do so in essence requires a “threat of penalty” before coercion would
be recognized. Without such concrete evidence of sanctions, Justice
Kennedy rejects the idea that coercion is implicit in a setting in
which petitioners are asked to pray by clergy invited to offer prayers
by the very decision-makers the petitioners are attempting to
influence and on whose discretionary judgments they are
dependent.275
Under the accepted premises and reasoning of Town of Greece,
a government official, bureaucrat, or legislative, administrative, or
adjudicatory body charged with exercising discretionary authority to
decide issues of great importance to applicants or petitioners can
invite clergy to offer a prayer at the beginning of a scheduled
appointment or proceeding. Applicants or petitioners can be asked to
stand, bow their heads, and join in the sectarian prayer offered by the
guest chaplain who prays in their name. The applicant or petitioner
should understand that their refusal to stand or participate in the
prayer will not be noticed by decision-makers or taken into account
in their deliberations. Also, they should recognize that by standing
and bowing their heads, their conduct will not be understood as
acquiescing in the prayer nor can it be reasonably experienced as
participating in a religious exercise. Thus, no unconstitutional
coercion of religious exercise exists in such situations.
In the real world, of course, such situations can only reasonably
be understood as intrinsically coercive. To refuse to recognize their
coercive
nature
demonstrates
either
an
extraordinary
misunderstanding of social reality or an extraordinary lack of
concern for religious liberty. Religious liberty receives no support in
either case.
Justice Alito appears to recognize that these kinds of state
sponsored prayer practices are constitutionally unacceptable. At least
that seems to be why he so emphatically rejects the implications of
Justice Kagan’s dissent that “this is where today’s decision leads”—
to the upholding of intrinsically coercive, divisive prayer practices in
a range of governmental settings.276 But Justice Alito never explains
why he believes the burdens on religious liberty and equality which
he ostensibly deems to be constitutionally unacceptable in Justice

275. See id.
276. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1834 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Kagan’s hypotheticals are not equally present in the context of
state-sponsored prayers at town board meetings. Justice Alito, after
all, joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court and that opinion
rejects the idea that the Town of Greece’s prayer practices burden
religious liberty or equality in any constitutionally meaningful way.
Without some coherent explanation as to why his concern about
coercion and religious inequality in Justice Kagan’s hypotheticals
does not carry over to the adjudication of challenges to town board
prayer practices, Justice Alito’s protests that this is not where the
Court or the country is going provides little solace or assurance to
those of us who care about religious liberty and equality as
constitutional values.

